# 1NC

### 1

#### Iran sanctions are at the top of the docket – Obama is spending capital to persuade Democrats to sustain a veto

Lobe, 12-27

Reporter for Inter Press Service(Jim, “Iran sanctions bill: Big test of Israel lobby power”

<http://www.arabamericannews.com/news/index.php?mod=article&cat=World&article=8046>)

WASHINGTON - This week’s introduction by a bipartisan group of 26 senators of a new sanctions bill against Iran could result in the biggest test of the political clout of the Israel lobby here in decades.¶ The White House, which says the bill could well derail ongoing negotiations between Iran and the U.S. and five other powers over Tehran’s nuclear program and destroy the international coalition behind the existing sanctions regime, has already warned that it will veto the bill if it passes Congress in its present form.¶ The new bill, co-sponsored by two of Congress’s biggest beneficiaries of campaign contributions by political action committees closely linked to the powerful American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), would impose sweeping new sanctions against Tehran if it fails either to comply with the interim deal it struck last month in Geneva with the P5+1 (U.S., Britain, France, Russia, China plus Germany) or reach a comprehensive accord with the great powers within one year.¶ To be acceptable, however, such an accord, according to the bill, would require Iran to effectively dismantle virtually its entire nuclear program, including any enrichment of uranium on its own soil, as demanded by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.¶ The government of President Hassan Rouhani has warned repeatedly that such a demand is a deal-breaker, and even Secretary of State John Kerry has said that a zero-enrichment position is a non-starter.¶ The bill, the Nuclear Weapon Free Iran Act, also calls for Washington to provide military and other support to Israel if its government “is compelled to take military action in legitimate self-defense against Iran’s nuclear weapon program.”¶ The introduction of the bill last week by Republican Sen. Mark Kirk and Democratic Sen. Robert Menendez followed unsuccessful efforts by both men to get some sanctions legislation passed since the Geneva accord was signed Nov. 24.¶ Kirk at first tried to move legislation that would have imposed new sanctions immediately in direct contradiction to a pledge by the P5+1 in the Geneva accord to forgo any new sanctions for the six-month life of the agreement in exchange for, among other things, enhanced international inspections of Iran’s nuclear facilities and a freeze on most of its nuclear program.¶ Unable to make headway, Kirk then worked with Menendez to draw up the new bill which, because of its prospective application, would not, according to them, violate the agreement. They had initially planned to attach it to a defense bill before the holiday recess. But the Democratic leadership, which controls the calendar, refused to go along.¶ Their hope now is to pass it – either as a free-standing measure or as an amendment to another must-pass bill after Congress reconvenes Jan. 6.¶ To highlight its bipartisan support, the two sponsors gathered a dozen other senators from each party to co-sponsor it.¶ Republicans, many of whom reflexively oppose President Barack Obama’s positions on any issue and whose core constituencies include Christian Zionists, are almost certain to support the bill by an overwhelming margin. If the bill gets to the floor, the main battle will thus take place within the Democratic majority.¶ The latter find themselves torn between, on the one hand, their loyalty to Obama and their fear that new sanctions will indeed derail negotiations and thus make war more likely, and, on the other, their general antipathy for Iran and the influence exerted by AIPAC and associated groups as a result of the questionable perception that Israel’s security is uppermost in the minds of Jewish voters and campaign contributors (who, by some estimates, provide as much as 40 percent of political donations to Democrats in national campaigns).¶ The administration clearly hopes the Democratic leadership will prevent the bill from coming to a vote, but, if it does, persuading most of the Democrats who have already endorsed the bill to change their minds will be an uphill fight. If the bill passes, the administration will have to muster 34 senators of the 100 senators to sustain a veto – a difficult but not impossible task, according to Congressional sources.¶ That battle has already been joined. Against the 13 Democratic senators who signed onto the Kirk-Menendez bill, 10 Democratic Senate committee chairs urged Majority Leader Harry Reid, who controls the upper chamber’s calendar, to forestall any new sanctions legislation.

#### Obama’s strategy is working but failure scuttles the nuclear deal

Merry 1-1

Robert W. Merry, political editor of the National Interest, is the author of books on American history and foreign policy (Robert, “Obama may buck the Israel lobby on Iran” Washington Times, factiva)

Presidential press secretary Jay Carney uttered 10 words the other day that represent a major presidential challenge to the American Israel lobby and its friends on Capitol Hill. Referring to Senate legislation designed to force President Obama to expand economic sanctions on Iran under conditions the president opposes, Mr. Carney said: “If it were to pass, the president would veto it.”¶ For years, there has been an assumption in Washington that you can’t buck the powerful Israel lobby, particularly the American Israel Public Affairs Committee, or AIPAC, whose positions are nearly identical with the stated aims of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. Mr. Netanyahu doesn’t like Mr. Obama’s recent overture to Iran, and neither does AIPAC. The result is the Senate legislation, which is similar to a measure already passed by the House.¶ With the veto threat, Mr. Obama has announced that he is prepared to buck the Israel lobby — and may even welcome the opportunity. It isn’t fair to suggest that everyone who thinks Mr. Obama’s overtures to Iran are ill-conceived or counterproductive is simply following the Israeli lobby’s talking points, but Israel’s supporters in this country are a major reason for the viability of the sanctions legislation the president is threatening to veto.¶ It is nearly impossible to avoid the conclusion that the Senate legislation is designed to sabotage Mr. Obama’s delicate negotiations with Iran (with the involvement also of the five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council and Germany) over Iran’s nuclear program. The aim is to get Iran to forswear any acquisition of nuclear weapons in exchange for the reduction or elimination of current sanctions. Iran insists it has a right to enrich uranium at very small amounts, for peaceful purposes, and Mr. Obama seems willing to accept that Iranian position in the interest of a comprehensive agreement.¶ However, the Senate measure, sponsored by Sens. Robert Menendez, New Jersey Democrat; Charles E. Schumer, New York Democrat; and Mark Kirk, Illinois Republican, would impose potent new sanctions if the final agreement accords Iran the right of peaceful enrichment. That probably would destroy Mr. Obama’s ability to reach an agreement. Iranian President Hasan Rouhani already is under pressure from his country’s hard-liners to abandon his own willingness to seek a deal. The Menendez-Schumer-Kirk measure would undercut him and put the hard-liners back in control.¶ Further, the legislation contains language that would commit the United States to military action on behalf of Israel if Israel initiates action against Iran. This language is cleverly worded, suggesting U.S. action should be triggered only if Israel acted in its “legitimate self-defense” and acknowledging “the law of the United States and the constitutional responsibility of Congress to authorize the use of military force,” but the language is stunning in its brazenness and represents, in the view of Andrew Sullivan, the prominent blogger, “an appalling new low in the Israeli government’s grip on the U.S. Congress.”¶ While noting the language would seem to be nonbinding, Mr. Sullivan adds that “it’s basically endorsing the principle of handing over American foreign policy on a matter as grave as war and peace to a foreign government, acting against international law, thousands of miles away.”¶ That brings us back to Mr. Obama’s veto threat. The American people have made clear through polls and abundant expression (especially during Mr. Obama’s flirtation earlier this year with military action against Bashar Assad’s Syrian regime) that they are sick and weary of American military adventures in the Middle East. They don’t think the Iraq and Afghanistan wars have been worth the price, and they don’t want their country to engage in any other such wars.¶ That’s what the brewing confrontation between Mr. Obama and the Israel lobby comes down to — war and peace. Mr. Obama’s delicate negotiations with Iran, whatever their outcome, are designed to avert another U.S. war in the Middle East. The Menendez-Schumer-Kirk initiative is designed to kill that effort and cedes to Israel America’s war-making decision in matters involving Iran, which further increases the prospects for war. It’s not even an argument about whether the United States should come to Israel’s aid if our ally is under attack, but whether the decision to do so and when that might be necessary should be made in Jerusalem or Washington.¶ 2014 will mark the 100th anniversary of beginning of World War I, a conflict triggered by entangling alliances that essentially gave the rulers of the Hapsburg Empire power that forced nation after nation into a war they didn’t want and cost the world as many as 20 million lives. Historians have warned since of the danger of nations delegating the power to take their people into war to other nations with very different interests.¶ AIPAC’s political power is substantial, but this is Washington power, the product of substantial campaign contributions and threats posed to re-election prospects. According to the Center for Responsive Politics’ Open Secrets website, Sens. Kirk, Menendez and Schumer each receives hundreds of thousands of dollars a year in pro-Israel PAC money and each of their states includes concentrations of pro-Israel voters who help elect and re-elect them.¶ Elsewhere in the country, AIPAC’s Washington power will collide with the country’s clear and powerful political sentiment against further U.S. adventurism in the Middle East, particularly one as fraught with as much danger and unintended consequence as a war with Iran. If the issue gets joined, as it appears that it will, Mr. Obama will see that it gets joined as a matter of war and peace. If the Menendez-Schumer-Kirk legislation clears Congress and faces a presidential veto, the war-and-peace issue could galvanize the American people as seldom before.¶ If that happens, the strongly held opinions of a democratic public are liable to overwhelm the mechanisms of Washington power, and the vaunted influence of the Israel lobby may be seen as being not quite what it has been cracked up to be.

#### Plan ensures huge battles between President and Congress

Zengerle 13 (Patricia, "Amid new security threats, some in Congress look to update 9/11 law,” 5/2, <http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/05/02/us-usa-congress-counterterrorism-idUSBRE94105V20130502>, CMR)

(Reuters) - **A** few **dozen words** rushed into law days after the September 11, 2001, attacks **have been used to justify** U.S. **counterterror**ism **efforts** **from** the **war** in Afghanistan **to** warrantless wiretapping and **drone strikes**, a**ll on orders of the White House - and with little congressional oversight**.¶ Now, as criticism grows that the law has been stretched well beyond its original intent to go after militant groups that did not even exist on 9/11, **some Democrats and Republicans have begun writing legislation to update the** nearly 12-year-old **resolution**.¶ **That could** restoke tensions **between Congress and the White House** over executive power, which were on display when Republican Senator Rand Paul staged a 13-hour filibuster in March to protest President Barack Obama's use of unmanned aircraft to conduct targeted killings.¶ "If you look back at the 60-word authorization that was put in place on September 18, 2001, and look at where we are today, there's a very, very thin thread, if any, between that authorization and what is occurring today," said Senator Bob Corker, a leader of the effort to examine the 2001 resolution. Its formal title is the Authorization to Use Military Force, or AUMF.¶ The top Republican on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Corker said he wanted to spell out the kind of counterterrorism activities that could be authorized, and to bring Congress back into the equation.¶ "**Congress has totally outsourced** its foreign policy **oversight**," he said in an interview. "And a lot of people like it that way. Congress can take credit if things go well, criticize if things don't go well, but in essence Congress has no ownership over what we are carrying out right now. That's not an appropriate place for Congress to be."¶ The AUMF gives the president authority to "use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons, in order to prevent any further acts of international terrorism against the United States by such nations, organizations, or persons."¶ It has no geographic limits or expiration date and, as such, has been the legal justification for drone campaigns in Pakistan and Yemen that have sometimes killed civilians and increased tensions among local populations.¶ In recent days, debates over U.S. national security policies have been roiled again by the Boston Marathon bombings, and a spreading hunger strike at the Guantanamo Bay prison for suspected foreign militants, which Obama pledged - and has failed - to close.¶ While opponents want the AUMF repealed, a group of more moderate legislators wants it adjusted to account for a changing world and to set precedent as other countries build their own counterterrorism - especially drone - programs.¶ It is not yet clear what a revised AUMF would look like. Some members of Congress want to spell out policies for conducting drone strikes. Many want its scope expanded to include militant groups not directly tied to or found to be "harboring" al Qaeda, including some operating in Africa, and to groups that target U.S. allies in its fight against terrorism.¶ Some say a "Son of AUMF" should include more controls, such as defining who can be detained and for how long, including U.S. citizens. Others said there should be some definition of when hostilities under the AUMF would end.¶ "The current AUMF is too broad, too narrow and too vague," Michael Leiter, former director of the National Counterterrorism Center, told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in March.¶ Most presidents, Obama included, guard their war-making powers jealously. White House officials have suggested they are open to changes in the AUMF, congressional aides said. Publicly at least, they have not offered specifics.¶ Obama, who has pledged more transparency over U.S. drone operations, said in October, "One of the things we've got to do is put a legal architecture in place, and we need congressional help in order to do that, to make sure that not only am I reined in but any president's reined in in terms of some of the decisions that we're making."¶ White House officials had no immediate comment.¶ 'GETTING OLD'¶ John Bellinger, then a legal adviser to Republican President George W. Bush's National Security Council, helped draft the AUMF "almost on the back of an envelope" when the ruins of the World Trade Center were still smoldering. Congress passed it three days after the attacks, and Bush signed it on September 18.¶ Bellinger said the measure needed an update. He noted, for example, that it was now being used to justify going after targets who were only 8 or 9 years old when the September 11 attacks occurred.¶ "It really is getting old," he said. "It was drafted extremely rapidly after September 11 and has covered a whole variety of different activities over the last 12 years that were not originally contemplated."¶ Bellinger, now a partner at the law firm Arnold & Porter, said there was a tension between those on the left - an important part of Obama's base - who want to cut the law back or repeal it and those who would revise it to provide authority to engage in more activities.¶ "If people ... were to delve into the legal theories, I think they would find that the administration is probably either really stretching the boundaries of the AUMF to cover some of the individuals or groups that they're targeting, or, without telling anyone, simply relying on the president's constitutional authority," Bellinger said.¶ Democratic Senator Carl Levin, the chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, said any effort to change the AUMF should be done carefully.¶ "It's a huge subject and there's not an easy answer to it. It takes a lot of thought and I myself have thought a lot about it, but I don't have an answer to (the question) if I could write a new AUMF, what would I say?" he said.

#### That emboldens the opposition and collapses the deal

**Muhammad, 12/31**/13 – cites David Bositis, Vice President and Senior Research Analyst at the Joint Center for Political and Economic Studies (Askia, The Final Call, “Obama's burden” <http://www.finalcall.com/artman/publish/National_News_2/article_101094.shtml> In foreign affairs, the President’s burden is made even more awkward by dug-in opposition by leaders of both parties here in this country. Despite unprecedented breakthroughs on his watch with Syria concerning its stockpile of chemical weapons, and with Iran concerning its nuclear enrichment plans, the Israel-lobby would prefer more saber-rattling and possible military action than any peaceful resolution. Other challenges are complicated by some of Mr. Obama’s own decisions. “On the international level,” Dr. Horne explained, “it’s clear that the Obama administration wants to pivot toward Asia, which mean’s China. “But, you may recall, when he first came into office that was to be accompanied by a reset with Russia, because it’s apparent that the United States confronting Russia and China together is more than a notion. And yet, the Obama administration finds itself doing both. “Look at its misguided policy towards Ukraine, for example, where it’s confronting Russia head-on, and its confrontation with China off the coast of eastern China. So, I guess in the longer term, it’s probably evident that the most severe challenge for the Obama administration comes from (the) international situation because as we begin to mark the 100th anniversary of the onset of World War I in 2014, it’s evident that unfortunately the international situation today, in an eerie way, resembles some ways the international situation at the end of 1913. “In the end of 1913 there was a rising Germany, just like there is a rising China. There was a declining Britain, just like there is a declining United States of America, and we all know the rather morbid consequences of World War I, so it is for that reason that I say that I would say that Mr. Obama’s most severe challenge is in the international arena,” said Dr. Horne. “In terms of foreign policy, his wanting to negotiate with Iran about their stopping their nuclear program, almost immediately there were people in the Congress speaking out in public who were totally against everything he wanted to do,” said Dr. Bositis. “There are people who don’t want to put any pressure on Israel about coming to terms with the Palestinians. There are people who are unhappy with what he’s done in terms of Syria,” he said. These stumbling blocks also stand in the way of the President’s ability to deliver on his pre-election promise to close the Guantanamo prison camp where hundreds are being detained, although most have been cleared for release by all U.S. intelligence agencies because they pose no threat to this country. Yet the prisoners languish, some even resorting to hunger strikes because of the hopelessness of their plight, with the U.S. turning to painful force-feeding the inmates to keep them from starving themselves to death. “Change is always hard,” Ms. Jarrett said Mr. Obama told a group of youth leaders recently. “The Civil Rights Movement was hard. People sacrificed their freedom. They went to prison. They got beat up. Look through our history and then look around the world. It’s always hard. You can’t lose faith because it’s hard. It just means you have to try harder. That’s really what drives him every day,” said Ms. Jarrett. And at the end of the day, Mr. Obama remains in control and holding all the “trump cards.” “Remember something,” Dr. Bositis said. “These people can say or make all these claims about Obama, but the fact of the matter is that Obama is president, and he’s going to be president for three more years, and he’s going to have a lot more influence than all of these clowns,” who disparage his leadership. “He’s not going to blink. He learned that lesson. With these guys, they’re like rapists. If you give them an inch, they will own you,” Dr. Bositis concluded.

#### Impact is global nuclear war

Press TV 11/13 “Global nuclear conflict between US, Russia, China likely if Iran talks fail”, <http://www.presstv.ir/detail/2013/11/13/334544/global-nuclear-war-likely-if-iran-talks-fail/>

A global conflict between the US, Russia, and China is likely in the coming months should the world powers fail to reach a nuclear deal with Iran, an American analyst says.¶ “If the talks fail, if the agreements being pursued are not successfully carried forward and implemented, then there would be enormous international pressure to drive towards a conflict with Iran before [US President Barack] Obama leaves office and that’s a very great danger that no one can underestimate the importance of,” senior editor at the Executive Intelligence Review Jeff Steinberg told Press TV on Wednesday. ¶ “The United States could find itself on one side and Russia and China on the other and those are the kinds of conditions that can lead to miscalculation and general roar,” Steinberg said. ¶ “So the danger in this situation is that if these talks don’t go forward, we could be facing a global conflict in the coming months and years and that’s got to be avoided at all costs when you’ve got countries like the United States, Russia, and China with” their arsenals of “nuclear weapons,” he warned. ¶ The warning came one day after the White House told Congress not to impose new sanctions against Tehran because failure in talks with Iran could lead to war. ¶ White House press secretary Jay Carney called on Congress to allow more time for diplomacy as US lawmakers are considering tougher sanctions. ¶ "This is a decision to support diplomacy and a possible peaceful resolution to this issue," Carney said. "The American people do not want a march to war." ¶ Meanwhile, US Secretary of State John Kerry is set to meet with the Senate Banking Committee on Wednesday to hold off on more sanctions on the Iranian economy. ¶ State Department spokeswoman Jen Psaki said Kerry "will be clear that putting new sanctions in place would be a mistake." ¶ "While we are still determining if there is a diplomatic path forward, what we are asking for right now is a pause, a temporary pause in sanctions. We are not taking away sanctions. We are not rolling them back," Psaki added.

### 2

#### The President of the United States should announce that the offensive use of drones constitutes an introduction of United States Armed Forces into hostilities for the purposes of the War Powers Resolution.

#### Presidential commitments solve

Marvin Kalb 13, Nonresident Senior Fellow at Foreign Policy, James Clark Welling Presidential Fellow, The George Washington University Edward R. Murrow Professor of Practice (Emeritus), Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, 2013, "The Road to War," book,pg. 7-8, www.brookings.edu/~/media/press/books/2013/theroadtowar/theroadtowar\_samplechapter.pdf

As we learned in Vietnam and in the broader Middle East, a presidential commitment could lead to war, based on miscalculation, misjudgment, or mistrust. It could also lead to reconciliation. We live in a world of uncertainty, where even the word of a president is now questioned in wider circles of critical commentary. On domestic policy, Washington often resembles a political circus detached from reason and responsibility. But on foreign policy, when an international crisis erupts and some degree of global leadership is required, the word or commitment of an American president still represents the gold standard, even if the gold does not glitter as once it did.

### 3

#### **Asking how the executive should be allowed to conduct war masks the fundamental question of whether war should be allowed at all – ensures a military mentality**

- Accepting that war is inevitable even without realizing it is problematic

Cady 10 (Duane L., prof of phil @ hamline university, From Warism to Pacifism: A Moral Continuum, pp. 22-23)

The widespread, unquestioning acceptance of warism and the corresponding reluctance to consider pacifism as a legitimate option make it difficult to propose a genuine consideration of pacifist alternatives. Warism may be held implicitly or explicitly. Held in its implicit form, it does not occur to the warist to challenge the view that war is morally justified; war is taken to be natural and normal. No other way of understanding large-scale human conflict even comes to mind. In this sense warism is like racism, sexism, and homophobia: a prejudicial bias built into conceptions and judgments without the awareness of those assuming it. In its explicit form, warism is openly accepted, articulated, and deliberately chosen as a value judgment on nations in conflict. War may be defended as essential for justice, needed for national security, as “the only thing the enemy understands,” and so on. In both forms warism misguides judgments and institutions by reinforcing the necessity and inevitability of war and precluding alternatives. Whether held implicitly or explicitly, warism obstructs questioning the conceptual framework of the culture. If we assume (without realizing it) that war itself is morally justifiable, our moral considerations of war will be focused on whether a particular war is justified or whether particular acts within a given war are morally acceptable. These are important concerns, but addressing them does not get at the fundamental issue raised by the pacifist: the morality of war as such. In Just and Unjust Wars Michael Walzer explains that “war is always judged twice, first with reference to the reasons states have for fighting, secondly with reference to the means they adopt.”8 The pacifist suggestion is that there is a third judgment of war that must be made prior to the other two: might war, by its very nature, be morally wrong? This issue is considered by Walzer only as an afterthought in an appendix, where it is dismissed as naïve. Perhaps Walzer should not be faulted for this omission, since he defines his task as describing the conventional morality of war and, as has been argued above, conventional morality does take warism for granted. To this extent Walzer is correct. And this is just the point: our warist conceptual frameworks— our warist normative lenses— blind us to the root question. The concern of pacifists is to expose the hidden warist bias and not merely describe cultural values. Pacifists seek to examine cultural values and recommend what they ought to be. This is why the pacifist insists on judging war in itself, a judgment more fundamental than the more limited assessments of the morality of a given war or the morality of specific acts within a particular war.

#### This mindset is important – our consciousness of war guarantees endless violence that ensures planetary destruction and structural violence

* Another impact: freeing ourselves from war = more resources for peace

Lawrence 9 (Grant, “Military Industrial "War" Consciousness Responsible for Economic and Social Collapse,” OEN—OpEdNews, March 27)

As a presidential candidate, [Barack Obama](http://obama.senate.gov/) called [Afghanistan](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/War_in_Afghanistan_%282001%E2%80%93present%29) ''the war we must win.'' He was absolutely right. Now it is time to win it... Senators [John McCain](http://www.imdb.com/name/nm0564587/) and Joseph Lieberman [calling](http://www.miamiherald.com/opinion/inbox/story/960269.html) for an expanded war in Afghanistan "How true it is that war can destroy everything of value." Pope Benedict XVI [decrying](http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5iuue8kE-e0lYZVFpt4RlbX4M_IEw) the suffering of Africa Where troops have been quartered, brambles and thorns spring up. In the track of great armies there must follow lean years. Lao Tzu on [War](http://www.sacred-texts.com/tao/salt/salt09.htm) As Americans we are raised on the utility of war to conquer every problem. We have a drug problem so we wage war on it. We have a cancer problem so we wage war on it. We have a crime problem so we wage war on it. Poverty cannot be dealt with but it has to be warred against. Terror is another problem that must be warred against. In the [United States](http://maps.google.com/maps?ll=38.8833333333,-77.0166666667&spn=10.0,10.0&q=38.8833333333,-77.0166666667%20%28United%20States%29&t=h), solutions can only be found in terms of wars. In a society that functions to support a massive military industrial war machine and empire, it is important that the terms promoted support the conditioning of its citizens. We are conditioned to see war as the solution to major social ills and major political disagreements. That way when we see so much of our resources devoted to war then we don't question the utility of it. The term "war" excites mind and body and creates a fear mentality that looks at life in terms of attack. In war, there has to be an attack and a must win attitude to carry us to victory. But is this war mentality working for us? In an age when nearly half of our tax money goes to support the war machine and a good deal of the rest is going to support the elite that control the war machine, we can see that our present war mentality is not working. Our values have been so perverted by our war mentality that we see sex as sinful but killing as entertainment. Our society is dripping violence. The violence is fed by poverty, social injustice, the break down of family and community that also arises from economic injustice, and by the managed media. The cycle of violence that exists in our society exists because it is useful to those that control society. It is easier to sell the war machine when your population is conditioned to violence. Our military industrial consciousness may not be working for nearly all of the life of the planet but it does work for the very few that are the master manipulators of our values and our consciousness. Rupert Murdoch, the media monopoly man that runs the "Fair and Balanced" [Fox Network](http://www.fox.com/), Sky Television, and [News Corp](http://www.newscorp.com/) just to name a few, [had](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rupert_Murdoch) all of his 175 newspapers editorialize in favor of the [Iraq war](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iraq_War). Murdoch snickers when [he says](http://www.newscorpse.com/ncWP/?p=341) "we tried" to manipulate public opinion." The Iraq war was a good war to Murdoch [because,](http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2004/07/b122948.html) "The death toll, certainly of Americans there, by the terms of any previous war are quite minute." But, to the media manipulators, the phony politicos, the military industrial elite, a million dead Iraqis are not to be considered. War is big business and it is supported by a war consciousness that allows it to prosper. That is why more war in Afghanistan, the war on Palestinians, and the other wars around the planet in which the [military industrial complex](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Military-industrial_complex) builds massive wealth and power will continue. The military industrial war mentality is not only killing, maiming, and destroying but it is also contributing to the present social and economic collapse. As mentioned previously, the massive wealth transfer that occurs when the American people give half of their money to support death and destruction is money that could have gone to support a just society. It is no accident that after years of war and preparing for war, our society is crumbling. Science and technological resources along with economic and natural resources have been squandered in the never-ending pursuit of enemies. All of that energy could have been utilized for the good of humanity, ¶ instead of maintaining the power positions of the very few super wealthy. So the suffering that we give is ultimately the suffering we get. Humans want to believe that they can escape the consciousness that they live in. But that consciousness determines what we experience and how we live. As long as we choose to live in "War" in our minds then we will continue to get "War" in our lives. When humanity chooses to wage peace on the world then there will be a flowering of life. But until then we will be forced to live the life our present war consciousness is creating.

#### The alternative must begin in our minds – we need to free ourselves of the presumption towards war and advocate for peace and social justice to stop the flow of militarism that threatens existence

* Democracy itself is the product of searching for peaceful solutions

Demenchonok 9 – Worked as a senior researcher at the Institute of Philosophy of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow, and is currently a Professor of Foreign Languages and Philosophy at Fort Valley State University in Georgia, listed in 2000 Outstanding Scholars of the 21st Century and is a recipient of the Twenty-First Century Award for Achievement in Philosophy from the International Biographical Centre --Edward, Philosophy After Hiroshima: From Power Politics to the Ethics of Nonviolence and Co-Responsibility, February, American Journal of Economics and Sociology, Volume 68, Issue 1, Pages 9-49

Where, then, does the future lie? Unilateralism, hegemonic political anarchy, mass immiseration, ecocide, and global violence—a Hobbesian bellum omnium contra omnes? Or international cooperation, social justice, and genuine collective—political and human—security? Down which path lies cowering, fragile hope?¶ Humanistic thinkers approach these problems from the perspective of their concern about the situation of individuals and the long-range interests of humanity. They examine in depth the root causes of these problems, warning about the consequences of escalation and, at the same time, indicating the prospect of their possible solutions through nonviolent means and a growing global consciousness. Today's world is in desperate need of realistic alternatives to violent conflict. Nonviolent action—properly planned and executed—is a powerful and effective force for political and social change. The ideas of peace and nonviolence, as expressed by Immanuel Kant, Leo Tolstoy, Mahatma Gandhi, Martin Luther King, and many contemporary philosophers—supported by peace and civil rights movements—counter the paralyzing fear with hope and offer a realistic alternative: a rational approach to the solutions to the problems, encouraging people to be the masters of their own destiny.¶ Fortunately, the memory of the tragedies of war and the growing realization of this new existential situation of humanity has awakened the global conscience and generated protest movements demanding necessary changes. During the four decades of the Cold War, which polarized the world, power politics was challenged by the common perspective of humanity, of the supreme value of human life, and the ethics of peace. Thus, in Europe, which suffered from both world wars and totalitarianism, spiritual-intellectual efforts to find solutions to these problems generated ideas of "new thinking," aiming for peace, freedom, and democracy. Today, philosophers, intellectuals, progressive political leaders, and peace-movement activists continue to promote a peaceful alternative. In the asymmetry of power, despite being frustrated by war-prone politics, peaceful projects emerge each time, like a phoenix arising from the ashes, as the only viable alternative for the survival of humanity. The new thinking in philosophy affirms the supreme value of human and nonhuman life, freedom, justice, and the future of human civilization. It asserts that the transcendental task of the survival of humankind and the rest of the biotic community must have an unquestionable primacy in comparison to particular interests of nations, social classes, and so forth. In applying these principles to the nuclear age, it considers a just and lasting peace as a categorical imperative for the survival of humankind, and thus proposes a world free from nuclear weapons and from war and organized violence.44 In tune with the Charter of the United Nations, it calls for the democratization of international relations and for dialogue and cooperation in order to secure peace, human rights, and solutions to global problems. It further calls for the transition toward a cosmopolitan order.¶ The escalating global problems are symptoms of what might be termed a contemporary civilizational disease, developed over the course of centuries, in which techno-economic progress is achieved at the cost of depersonalization and dehumanization. Therefore, the possibility of an effective "treatment" today depends on whether or not humankind will be able to regain its humanity, thus establishing new relations of the individual with himself or herself, with others, and with nature. Hence the need for a new philosophy of humanity and an ethics of nonviolence and planetary co-responsibility to help us make sense not only of our past historical events, but also of the extent, quality, and urgency of our present choices.

### 4

#### Interpretation - The phrase “introduction of USAF into hostilities” is a term of art – refers exclusively to human members – excludes weapon systems

Eric Lorber  UPenn Law School; Duke University - Department of Political Science March 1, 2013, (Executive Warmaking Authority and Offensive Cyber Operations: Can Existing Legislation Successfully Constrain Presidential Power?, University of Pennsylvania Journal of Constitutional Law, Vol. 15, No. 3, pp. 961, 2013, downloaded here <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2017036>)

As is evident from a textual analysis,177 an examination of the legislative history,178 and the broad policy purposes behind the creation of the Act,179 “armed forces” refers to U.S. soldiers and members of the armed forces, not weapon systems or capabilities such as offensive cyber weapons. Section 1547 does not specifically define “armed forces,” but it states that “the term ‘introduction of United States Armed Forces’ includes the assignment of members of such armed forces to command, coordinate, participate in the movement of, or accompany the regular or irregular military forces of any foreign country or government.”180 While this definition pertains to the broader phrase “introduction of armed forces,” the clear implication is that only members of the armed forces count for the purposes of the definition under the WPR. Though not dispositive, the term “member” connotes a human individual who is part of an organization.181 Thus, it appears that the term “armed forces” means human members of the United States armed forces. However, there exist two potential complications with this reading. First, the language of the statute states that “the term ‘introduction of United States Armed Forces’ includes the assignment of members of such armed forces.”182

#### Violation – the aff just defines something new as armed forces, doesn’t increase a restriction on armed forces

#### Vote neg

#### Limits – they can define anything as Armed forces to artificially increase restrictions on that – explodes the topic to any weapon system or war tactic

#### Ground – all topic literature assumes status quo definitions – allowing affs that redefine topic terms to be more expansive avoids the lit base and therefore the controversy

### Solvency

#### Obama will circumvent the plan --- empirics prove

Levine 12 - Law Clerk; J.D., May 2012, University of Michigan Law School (David Levine, 2013 SURVEY OF BOOKS RELATED TO THE LAW: BOOK NOTICE: A TIME FOR PRESIDENTIAL POWER? WAR TIME AND THE CONSTRAINED EXECUTIVE, 111 Mich. L. Rev. 1195)

Both the Declare War Clause n49 and the War Powers Resolution n50 give Congress some control over exactly when "wartime" exists. While the U.S. military was deployed to Libya during the spring and summer of 2011, the Obama Administration advanced the argument that, under the circumstances, it was bound by neither clause. n51 If Dudziak is worried about "war's presence as an ongoing feature of American democracy" (p. 136), Libya is a potent case study with implications for the use of force over the coming decades.

Article I, Section 8 of the U.S. Constitution grants to Congress the power to "declare War, grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal, and make Rules concerning Captures on Land and Water." n52 Although there is substantial debate on the precise scope of these powers, n53 this clause at least provides some measure of congressional control over significant commitments of U.S. forces to battle. However, it has long been accepted that presidents, acting pursuant to the commander-in-chief power, may "introduce[] armed forces into situations in which they encounter[], or risk[] encountering, hostilities, but which [are] not "wars' in either the common meaning or the [\*1207] constitutional sense." n54 Successive administrations have adopted some variant of that view and have invariably deployed U.S. forces abroad in a limited manner based on this inherent authority. n55

The Obama Administration has adopted this position - that a president has inherent constitutional authority to deploy forces outside of war - and even sought to clarify it. In the Office of Legal Counsel's ("OLC") memo to President Obama on the authority to use military force in Libya, n56 the Administration acknowledged that the Declare War Clause is a "possible constitutionally-based limit on ... presidential authority to employ military force." n57 The memo reasoned that the Constitution speaks only to Congress's ability to shape engagements that are "wars," and that presidents have deployed forces in limited contexts from the earliest days of the Union. n58 Acknowledging those facts, the memo concluded that the constitutional limit on congressional power must be the conceptual line between war and not war. In locating this boundary, the memo looked to the "anticipated nature, scope, and duration" of the conflict to which President Obama was introducing forces. n59 OLC found that the "war" standard "will be satisfied only by prolonged and substantial military engagements, typically involving exposure of U.S. military personnel to significant risk over a substantial period." n60

The Obama Administration's position was not out of sync with previous presidential practice - the Declare War Clause did not require congressional approval prior to executive deployment of troops. In analyzing the "nature, scope, and duration" questions, the memo looked first to the type of missions that U.S. forces would be engaged in. The air missions envisioned for the Libya operation did not pose the threat of withdrawal difficulty or escalation risk that might indicate "a greater need for approval [from Congress] at the outset." n61 The nature of the mission, then, was not similar to full "war." Similarly, the scope of the intended operation was primarily limited, at the time the memo was written, to enforcing a no-fly zone. n62 Consequently, [\*1208] the operation's expected duration was not long. Thus, concluded OLC, "the use of force by the United States in Libya [did not rise] to the level of a "war' in the constitutional sense." n63 While this conclusion may have been uncontroversial, it highlights Dudziak's concerns over the manipulation of the idea of "wartime," concerns that were heightened by the Obama Administration's War Powers Resolution analysis. Congress passed the War Powers Resolution in 1973 in an attempt to rein in executive power in the wake of the Vietnam War. n64 The resolution provides that the president shall "in every possible instance ... consult with Congress before introducing United States Armed Forces into hostilities or into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances." n65 Additionally, when the president sends U.S. forces "into hostilities or into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated," the resolution requires him to submit a report to Congress describing the circumstances of the deployment and the expected involvement of U.S. troops in the "hostilities." n66 Within sixty days of receiving that report, Congress must either declare war or in some other way extend the deployment; in the absence of some ratifying action, the resolution requires that the president withdraw U.S. forces. n67 Though eschewing the plainly confrontational route of directly challenging Congress's power under the War Powers Resolution, the Obama Administration implicitly challenged Congress's ability to affect future operations. In declining to withdraw forces, despite Congress's lack of approving legislation, President Obama claimed that the conflict in Libya could not be deemed "hostilities" as that term is used in the resolution. This argument was made both in a letter to Congress during the summer of 2011 n68 and in congressional testimony given by Harold Koh, the State Department Legal Advisor under the Obama Administration. n69 [\*1209] Koh's testimony provides the most complete recitation of the Obama Administration's analysis and focuses on four factors that distinguish the fighting in Libya (or at least the United States' participation) from "hostilities": the scope of the mission, the exposure of U.S. forces, the risk of escalation, and the nature of the tactics to be used. First, "the mission is limited." n70 That is, the objectives of the overall campaign led by the North American Treaty Organization ("NATO") were confined to a "civilian protection operation ... implementing a U.N. Security Council resolution." n71 Second, the "exposure" of the U.S. forces involved was narrow - the conflict did not "involve active exchanges of fire with hostile forces" in ways that would endanger U.S. service members' safety. n72 Third, the fact that the "risk of escalation [was] limited" weighed in favor of not categorizing the conflict as "hostilities." n73 Finally, the "military means" the United States used in Libya were limited in nature. n74 The majority of missions were focused on "providing intelligence capabilities and refueling assets." n75 Those American flights that were air-to-ground missions were a mix of suppression-of-enemy-air-defenses operations to enforce a no-fly zone and strikes by armed Predator drones. n76 As a point of comparison, Koh noted that "the total number of U.S. munitions dropped has been a tiny fraction of the number dropped in Kosovo." n77 With the exception of this final factor, these considerations are quite similar to the factors that define whether a conflict is a "war" for constitutional purposes. n78

The result of this reasoning is a substantially relaxed restraint on presidential authority to use force abroad going forward. As armed drones begin [\*1210] to make up a larger portion of the United States' arsenal, n79 and as other protective technologies, such as standoff munitions n80 and electronic warfare techniques, gain traction, it is far more likely that the "exposure" of U.S. forces will decrease substantially. The force used in Yemen and the Horn of Africa is illustrative of this new paradigm where U.S. service members are not "involved [in] active exchanges of fire with hostile forces," n81 but rather machines use force by acting as human proxies. To the same point, if the "military means" used in Libya are markers of something short of "hostilities," the United States is only likely to see the use of those means increase in the coming decades. Pressing the logic of Koh's testimony, leeway for unilateral executive action will increase as the makeup of our arsenal continues to modernize. n82

Dudziak worries about the invocation of "wartime" as an argument for the perpetual exercise of extraordinary powers. The Libya scenario, of course, is somewhat different - the president has argued that the absence of "war" leaves him a residuum of power such that he may use force abroad without congressional input. The two positions are of a piece, though. Dudziak argues that legacy conceptions of "wartime" and "peacetime" have left us vulnerable to the former's use, in and of itself, as a reason for increased executive power. Such literal thinking - that "war" is something specific or that the word "hostilities" has certain limits - also opens the door to the Obama Administration's defense of its position on Libya. And looking at the substance of that position leaves much to be desired.

Both Koh's testimony and the OLC memo pay lip service to the idea that the policy considerations underlying their position are consistent with the policy considerations of the Framers with respect to the Declare War Clause and Congress with respect to the War Powers Resolution. But the primary, if not the only, consideration mentioned is the loss of U.S. forces. That concern is front and center when analyzing the "exposure" of service [\*1211] members, n83 and it is also on display with respect to discussions about the nature and scope of an operation. n84 This is not the only policy consideration that one might intuit from those two provisions, however. Using lethal force abroad is a very serious matter, and the U.S. polity might rationally want input from the more representative branch in deciding when, where, and how that force is used in its name. In that same vein, permitting one individual to embroil the nation in foreign conflicts - limited or otherwise - without the input of another coequal branch of government is potentially dangerous. n85

As Dudziak's framework highlights the limits of the Obama Administration's argument for expansive power, so does the Administration's novel dissection of "hostilities" illustrate the limits of Dudziak's analysis. Dudziak presents a narrative arc bending toward the expansion of wartime and, as a result, increased presidential power. That is not the case with Libya: the president finds power in "not war" rather than in "wartime." If the American public is guilty, as Dudziak asserts, of using the outmoded and misleadingly concrete terminology of "wartime" to describe an increasingly complex phenomenon, Dudziak herself is guilty of operating within a paradigm where wartime necessarily equals more executive power (than does "not war"), a paradigm that has been supplanted by a more nuanced reality. Although [\*1212] Dudziak identifies the dangers of manipulating the boundaries of wartime, her catalog of manipulations remains incomplete because of the inherent limits of her framework.

This realization does not detract from Dudziak's warnings about the perils of endless wartime, however. Indeed, the powers that President Obama has claimed seem, perhaps, more palatable after a decade in which war has been invoked as an argument for many executive powers that would, in other eras, seem extraordinary. Though he has not explicitly invoked war during the Libya crisis, President Obama has certainly shown a willingness to manipulate its definition in the service of expanded executive power in ways that seem sure to increase "war's presence as an ongoing feature of American democracy" (p. 136).

Conclusion Dudziak presents a compelling argument and supports it well. War Time is potent as a rhetorical device and as a way to frame decisionmaking. This is especially so for the executive branch of the U.S. government, for which wartime has generally meant increased, and ever more expansive, power. As the United States continues to transit an era in which the lines between "war" and "peace" become increasingly blurred and violent adversaries are a constant, the temptation to claim wartime powers - to render the extraordinary ordinary - is significant.

This Notice has argued that, contrary to Dudziak's concerns, the temptation is not absolute. Indeed, in some instances - notably, detention operations in Iraq and Afghanistan - we are still able to differentiate between "war" and "peace" in ways that have hard legal meaning for the actors involved. And, importantly, the executive still feels compelled to abide by these distinctions and act in accordance with the law rather than claim wartime exceptionalism.

That the temptation is not absolute, however, does not mean that it is not real or that Dudziak's concerns have not manifested themselves. This detachment of expansive power from temporally bound periods has opened the door for, and in some ways incentivized, limiting wartime rather than expanding it. While President Obama has recognized the legal constraints that "war" imposes, he has also followed in the footsteps of executives who have attempted to manipulate the definition of "war" itself (and now the definition of "hostilities") in order to evade those constraints as much as possible. To the extent he has succeeded in that evasion, he has confirmed what seems to be Dudziak's greatest fear: that "military engagement no longer seems to require the support of the American people, but instead their inattention" (p. 132).

#### The President doesn’t even have to try – the plan literally does nothing. Every use of drone warfare is already authorized by Congress via the AUMF. Star this card because it proves the aff does nothing.

AUMF, 2001 (Authorization for Use of Military Force, S.J.Res. 23 (107th): Authorization for Use of Military Force, 107th Congress, 2001–2002. Text as of Sep 18, 2001 (Passed Congress/Enrolled Bill), govtrack.us, https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/107/sjres23/text)

S.J.Res.23 One Hundred Seventh Congress of the United States of America AT THE FIRST SESSION Begun and held at the City of Washington on Wednesday, the third day of January, two thousand and one Joint Resolution To authorize the use of United States Armed Forces against those responsible for the recent attacks launched against the United States. Whereas, on September 11, 2001, acts of treacherous violence were committed against the United States and its citizens; and Whereas, such acts render it both necessary and appropriate that the United States exercise its rights to self-defense and to protect United States citizens both at home and abroad; and Whereas, in light of the threat to the national security and foreign policy of the United States posed by these grave acts of violence; and Whereas, such acts continue to pose an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security and foreign policy of the United States; and Whereas, the President has authority under the Constitution to take action to deter and prevent acts of international terrorism against the United States: Now, therefore, be it Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. This joint resolution may be cited as the ‘Authorization for Use of Military Force’. SEC. 2. AUTHORIZATION FOR USE OF UNITED STATES ARMED FORCES. (a) IN GENERAL- That the President is authorized to use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons, in order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the United States by such nations, organizations or persons. (b) War Powers Resolution Requirements- (1) SPECIFIC STATUTORY AUTHORIZATION- Consistent with section 8(a)(1) of the War Powers Resolution, the Congress declares that this section is intended to constitute specific statutory authorization within the meaning of section 5(b) of the War Powers Resolution. (2) APPLICABILITY OF OTHER REQUIREMENTS- Nothing in this resolution supercedes any requirement of the War Powers Resolution. Speaker of the House of Representatives. Vice President of the United States and President of the Senate.

### Prolif

**US action irrelevant to international norms on drones – other tech proves**

**Etzioni 13** – professor of IR @ George Washington (Amitai, “The Great Drone Debate”, March/April, <http://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/MilitaryReview/Archives/English/MilitaryReview_20130430_art004.pdf>, CMR)

Other critics contend that by the United States using drones, it leads other countries into making and using them. For example, Medea Benjamin, the cofounder of the anti-war activist group CODEPINK and author of a book about drones argues that, “The proliferation of drones should evoke reﬂection on the precedent that the United States is setting by killing anyone it wants, anywhere it wants, on the basis of secret information. Other nations and non-state entities are watching—and are bound to start acting in a similar fashion.”60 Indeed scores of countries are now manufacturing or purchasing drones. There can be little doubt that the fact that drones have served the United States well has helped to popularize them. However, it does not follow that United States should not have employed drones in the hope that such a show of restraint would deter others. First of all, this would have meant that either the United States would have had to allow terrorists in hardto-reach places, say North Waziristan, to either roam and rest freely—or it would have had to use bombs that would have caused much greater collateral damage. Further, the record shows that even when the United States did not develop a particular weapon, others did. Thus, China has taken the lead in the development of anti-ship missiles and seemingly cyber weapons as well. One must keep in mind that the international environment is a hostile one. Countries—and especially non-state actors— most of the time do not play by some set of self constraining rules. Rather, they tend to employ whatever weapons they can obtain that will further their interests. The United States correctly does not assume that it can rely on some non-existent implicit gentleman’s agreements that call for the avoidance of new military technology by nation X or terrorist group Y—if the United States refrains from employing that technology. I am not arguing that there are no natural norms that restrain behavior. There are certainly some that exist, particularly in situations where all parties beneﬁt from the norms (e.g., the granting of diplomatic immunity) or where particularly horrifying weapons are involved (e.g., weapons of mass destruction). However drones are but one step—following bombers and missiles—in the development of distant battleﬁeld technologies. (Robotic soldiers—or future ﬁghting machines— are next in line). In such circumstances, the role of norms is much more limited.

**No drones arms race – multiple checks**

- narrow application – diplomatic and political costs – state defenses

**Singh 12** – researcher at the Center for a New American Security (Joseph, “Betting Against a Drone Arms Race”, 8/13, <http://nation.time.com/2012/08/13/betting-against-a-drone-arms-race/#ixzz2TxEkUI37>, CMR)

Bold predictions of a coming drones arms race are all the rage since the uptake in their deployment under the Obama Administration. Noel Sharkey, for example, argues in an August 3 op-ed for the Guardian that rapidly developing drone technology — coupled with minimal military risk — portends an era in which states will become increasingly aggressive in their use of drones.¶ As drones develop the ability to fly completely autonomously, Sharkey predicts a proliferation of their use that will set dangerous precedents, seemingly inviting hostile nations to use drones against one another. Yet, **the narrow applications of** current **drone tech**nology **coupled with** what we know about **state behavior** in the international system **lend no credence to** these **ominous warnings**.¶ Indeed, critics seem overly-focused on the domestic implications of drone use.¶ In a June piece for the Financial Times, Michael Ignatieff writes that “virtual technologies make it easier for democracies to wage war because they eliminate the risk of blood sacrifice that once forced democratic peoples to be prudent.”¶ Significant public support for the Obama Administration’s increasing deployment of drones would also seem to legitimate this claim. Yet, **there remain** equally **serious** **diplomatic and political** **costs** that emanate from **beyond a fickle electorate, which** will **prevent** the likes of the **increased drone aggression** predicted by both Ignatieff and Sharkey.¶ Most recently, **the** serious **diplomatic scuffle instigated by Syria**’s **downing a Turkish reconnaissance plane** in June **illustrated** **the** very serious **risks** of operating any aircraft in foreign territory.¶ **States** **launching drones must still weigh** the **diplomatic and political costs** of their actions, **which make the calculation surrounding their use no fundamentally different** to any other aerial engagement.¶ **This** recent bout also **illustrated a salient point** regarding drone technology: **most states maintain** at least minimal air **defenses that can quickly detect and take down drones**, as the U.S. discovered when it employed drones at the onset of the Iraq invasion, while Saddam Hussein’s surface-to-air missiles were still active.¶ What the U.S. also learned, however, was that **drones constitute an effective military tool in an extremely narrow strategic context.** They are well-suited either in direct support of a broader military campaign, or to conduct targeted killing operations against a technologically unsophisticated enemy.¶ In a nutshell, then, the very contexts in which we have seen drones deployed. Northern Pakistan, along with a few other regions in the world, remain conducive to drone usage given a lack of air defenses, poor media coverage, and difficulties in accessing the region.

#### Syria proves no drone wars---they’re useless against any adversary with an air defense system

Cronin 9-2, Audrey Kurth, Professor of Public Policy at George Mason University, 9/2/13, “Drones Over Damascus,” http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/139889/audrey-kurth-cronin/drones-over-damascus

For the past four years, Americans have been preoccupied with drone technology as a cheap, low-risk, and discriminate way to eliminate emerging global threats without getting entangled in protracted conflicts. The U.S. government has even dramatically changed its military force structure to make armed drones a lynchpin of U.S. power projection. Yet these weapons have been virtually useless in the last two conflicts that the United States has faced, first in Libya and now in Syria. Why is that? Broadly speaking, the United States has used armed drone strikes overseas in two ways: during war and to prevent war. Battlefield use of weaponized drones is not new (it dates back to World War I), and is fairly ubiquitous. A spring 2013 report by the U.S. Air Force estimated that unmanned aircraft fired about a quarter of all missiles used in coalition air strikes in Afghanistan in the early part of this year. Drones have proved remarkably effective at providing reconnaissance to U.S. troops on the ground, protecting them from enemy attacks, and reducing civilian casualties. When used within a war, in other words, drones are a great way to give U.S. soldiers an edge. Armed drones have a preventive role to play, as well. They can keep terrorist threats at bay, and thus reduce the chance that Washington will need to send troops to battle insurgents in faraway places. Since 2009, U.S. counterterrorism efforts have involved hundreds of remote-controlled strikes by unmanned aerial vehicles. These were meant to prevent attacks on the United States and its allies by al Qaeda, the Taliban, and other groups. In these cases, the argument goes, discriminate targeting to prevent such attacks beats invading countries after them. Prevention has thus become a watchword of U.S. policy, but its logic has rarely been applied to belligerent states. The international community had plenty of warning that the Syrian government might use chemical weapons, and now Syrian President Bashar al-Assad has apparently employed sarin gas to kill thousands of civilians. Photographs of rows of children left dead and videos of civilians running in fear have shocked the world. The last time the gas was used -- in Japan by Aum Shinrikyo, a terrorist group, to kill 13 people on the Tokyo subway -- pales in comparison with the recent slaughter in Syria. Could the United States have deployed its drone fleet to destroy Syrian arsenals or to kill those planning to make use of them before this happened? The answer is no. Armed drones have serious limitations, and the situation in Syria lays them bare. They are only useful where the United States has unfettered access to airspace, a well-defined target, and a clear objective. In Syria, the United States lacks all three. First, the airspace. So far, armed drones have been used either over countries that do not control their own airspace (Somalia, Mali, Afghanistan) or where the government has given the United States some degree of permission (Yemen, Pakistan). Those circumstances are rare. When the foe can actually defend itself, the use of armed drones is extraordinarily difficult and could constitute an act of war -- one that could easily draw the United States into the heart of a conflict. Drones are slow and noisy; they fly at a low altitude; and they require time to hover over a potential target before being used. They are basically sitting ducks. Syria has an air force and air defenses that could easily pick American drones out of the sky. The only real way for the United States to use them would be to first destroy Syrian planes and anti-aircraft batteries. But that would be no different from a full-scale intervention and would negate the tactical advantage of remote strikes. In other words, the conditions under which armed drones are effective as preventive weapons are limited. And the more drones are used for prevention and during war, the more state belligerents will take note of that fact, and will make sure that those conditions are never met on their own territory. Second, the target. Using armed drones against the Syrian government’s enormous chemical weapons stockpiles would have risked causing the very release of deadly agents that the United States was trying to avoid. Drones are precise but not perfect. Like cruise missiles, their effectiveness mainly depends upon the quality of their targeting information. Worse, an imperfect attack could inadvertently give the Assad government political cover to use the weapons with impunity. Assad could blame the release of chemical weapons on a misfired U.S. drone strike. Since U.S. drones are deeply despised in the Middle East, that argument could enjoy wide hearing. Perhaps the United States might instead have tried to target chemical weapons delivery systems or tried to kill the people who were loading or moving them. But intelligence has been insufficient for such delicate operations. And even if U.S. officials got it right, a remote drone attack would have risked giving the rebels access to remaining stockpiles of chemical weapons or delivery systems. As the United States knows, some of those group are connected to al Qaeda. In such a mess of a situation, and especially in the presence of Syria’s large arsenal, there is no alternative to putting humans on the ground to secure dangerous, volatile weapons. Drones –- or cruise missiles, for that matter -- cannot do it. Third, the objective. The United States wants to punish the Assad regime for using chemical weapons against the Syrian people and to prevent them from being used again. Drone attacks are ill suited for this purpose. They are unlikely either to inflict sufficient pain or to deter other tyrants from following Assad’s lead. A broader objective is to reinforce the global norm against the use of chemical weapons, and such a lofty goal can only be accomplished with a robust international response. In a politically complex environment -- one in which the United States is not at war and the targets are unclear -- armed drones are really not all that useful. They might seem like a cool new tool to many observers and policymakers, but the horrible predicament in Syria reveals the sharp limitations of the technology -- and the serious problem of relying upon it so heavily in the U.S. force structure. Rather than looking for a quick technological fix, U.S. policymakers should invest more in good analysis and robust human assets on the ground, so as to sort friend from foe. The United States can take the pilot out of the aircraft, but it cannot remove human judgment, risk, and willpower from war -- especially if it plans to keep intervening in murky conflicts in the Middle East.

### Blowback

#### We will explicitly concede the Zenko evidence. Public backlash will collapse the drone program now – that solves almost all of the aff. The Maxwell evidence on Norms just says Congress must “amend the AUMF to give the executive a statutory roadmap that articulates when force is appropriate and under what circumstances the President can use targeted killing. This would be the needed endorsement from Congress, the other political branch of government, to clarify the U.S. position on its use of force regarding targeted killing”

#### It also solves their Yemen scenario. Their Greenfield evidence says “– we cannot simply kill our way out of this problem” Even if larger restrictions than the aff aren’t NECESSARY, they’re SUFFICIENT to solve the aff’s advantages.

#### Also solves EU – Streeter evidence says key allies disapprove of US drone policy. Says “the United States seems heavy handed and brutish; holding back technology while indiscriminately using it against our enemies. The lack of consideration and cooperation is a negative influence on world leaders”.

#### Now, they aff saves the targeted killing program, means there’s only a risk that circumvention straight turns this advantage because the program will be substantially gutted without intervention to stave off public backlash.

#### Next is our offense. Targeted killing fails and exacerbates terrorism – best evidence goes neg

Dear 12-5-13 (Keith Patrick, has a decade of experience in analyzing human behaviours and systems both in the UK and overseas, MA with distinction in terrorism and counter-terrorism from King’s College London, Squadron Leader in the Royal Air Force, “Beheading the Hydra? Does Killing Terrorist or Insurgent Leaders Work,” <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14702436.2013.845383>, CMR)

Conclusion Targeted killing, used highly selectively and with a transparent targeting process, can be of tactical use, temporarily reducing insurgents’ capability, and disrupting facilitation networks and leadership structure. It does not follow that a repeated use of targeted killing will cause a greater reduction in insurgent capability. Insurgent networks adapt in response to targeted killing, changing structure and dispersing capability to ensure their resilience. Furthermore, targeted killing radicalises. Its effect on insurgent groups is to unify and reduce dissent, precisely the opposite of the psychological effects the counterinsurgent intends. Some will be deterred, but a greater number will seek revenge and in kinship-based societies this will destabilise government and security structures. Overall, the evolution that targeted killing forces insurgent groups to undergo is profoundly counterproductive. It often draws in recruits in search of revenge resulting in larger groups, consolidates alliances between disparate radicals, widens the zone of instability as the groups seek new safe havens, and risks regionalising or internationalising previously local conflicts. It brings to the fore a younger leadership, who are usually more radical, indiscriminate and violent than those they replace. They preside over groups that are both more resilient and united as a result of targeted killing. Counterinsurgents have failed to fully appreciate the counterproductive effects of targeted killing because they offer political and bureaucratic utility to politicians and the military alike. The true effects are further obscured by a lack of true comprehension of the situation among intelligence staff, the use of simplistic analogies and the misuse of, and reliance on, SNA as a means for judging success or failure. In an insurgency being driven by short political timescales, as in Afghanistan, targeted killing may serve policy, used as a line of operation in support of others. As it accelerates the insurgency’s radicalisation and use of more indiscriminate violence, the population may seek the government’s protection, while the senior leadership in exile may be encouraged to negotiate for fear of losing support from the population and losing control of the insurgency to the radical in-country operational leadership. The great risk of this tactic is that if it fails it will leave a more radical, more indiscriminate insurgency, with wider regional and global aims, and deeper links to Al-Qaeda than ever before. In Afghanistan, given that the coalition’s 2001 aim was to expel Al-Qaeda from Afghanistan, leaving Afghanistan with the Taliban and Al-Qaeda indistinguishable would be a very visible failure of targeted killing specifically and coalition policy in Afghanistan more broadly.

#### ‘Drone effectiveness’ is academic garbage---no data or methodology

Boyle 13 – Prof of PoliSci @ La Salle University, former adviser on the Obama campaign's counterterrorism expert group (Michael J, “The costs and consequences of drone warfare,” International Affairs 89: 1 (2013) 1–29, CMR)

Arguments for the effectiveness of drones can be subdivided into four separate claims: (1) that drones are effective at killing terrorists with minimal civilian casualties; (2) that drones have been successful at killing so-called ‘high value targets’ (HVTs); (3) that the use of drones puts such pressure on terrorist organizations that it degrades their organizational capacity and ability to strike; and (4) that a cost–benefit analysis of their use relative to other options—such as the deployment of ground troops—provides a compelling argument in their favour. None of these claims should be taken at face value. The evidence behind each is often less compelling than is assumed, in part because reliable data on the drone strikes and their effects are difficult to obtain. Some of these arguments are based on dubious counterfactuals that try to measure the costs of drone strikes against the effects of prevented, and entirely hypothetical, enemy attacks.17 Others conflate efficiency—that is, an advantageous ratio of inputs to outputs in executing an activity—with the effectiveness of a particular action in achieving a wider goal. Still others operate with an attenuated notion of effectiveness which focuses exclusively at the tactical level without considering the wider strategic costs of drone warfare. The position of the American foreign policy establishment on drones— that they are an effective tool which minimizes civilian casualties—is based on a highly selective and partial reading of the evidence.

#### Turn: Youth bubble – targeted killing eliminates moderates who are replaced by younger and more violent leaders

Dear 12-5-13 (Keith Patrick, has a decade of experience in analyzing human behaviours and systems both in the UK and overseas, MA with distinction in terrorism and counter-terrorism from King’s College London, Squadron Leader in the Royal Air Force, “Beheading the Hydra? Does Killing Terrorist or Insurgent Leaders Work,” <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14702436.2013.845383>, CMR)

A Younger, More Radical, Less Discriminate Insurgent Aaron Mannes’ and Jenna Jordan’s studies of targeting killing found that insurgents, particularly religiously motivated groups, became more radical and violent when their leaders were killed.136 The effect increased with each subsequent leader killed.137 Targeted killing’s psychological and cultural effects increase radicalisation. These effects can be magnified as targeted killing removes older leaders, who tend to be more pragmatic, promoting a radical youthful leadership no longer restrained by their elders. This youthful leadership will often have grown up fighting the counterinsurgents and should not therefore always be miscategorised as ‘inexperienced’. In two years, the Taliban have lost an entire generation of leaders in many parts of Afghanistan. In 2010 in the north of Afghanistan, night raids reduced the average age of the Taliban leadership from 35 to 25.138 In the 12 months to May 2011 in Helmand Province, night raids achieved the same effect, reducing the average age of the Taliban leadership from 35 to 23.139 In 2001 the Taliban contained a few youthful extremists restrained by an elder leadership.140 The Taliban leadership in 2011 is younger, more radical, more violent and less discriminate than in 2001, because of targeted killing.141 This new in-country leadership have increasingly adopted Al-Qaeda’s terrorist tactics and have deeper links with Al-Qaeda than their predecessors.142 In the North, Uzbek leaders, linked through the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) to Al-Qaeda, are increasing in prominence.143 Without targeted killing, the more pragmatic, less indiscriminately violent, leaders would remain as the killing of Mullah Sadiq demonstrates. Al-Jazeera journalist Qais Azimy met with Sadiq several times. He describes the 35-year- old as a pragmatist, noting his anger at the actions of the extremist fringe of the Taliban.144 Today, that fringe dominates the insurgency. Mullah Abdul Hakim Mujahid, a deputy leader of Hamid Karzai’s peace council and former Taliban ambassador to the United Nations says that targeted killing has eliminated older pragmatic commanders and that ‘the fanatical ones have come in their place ... In that way we are losing a lot of politically-minded Taliban. The new ones have a more religious mentality. They are only fighters.’145 Not only are the new leadership more radical and indiscriminately violent, they are also less likely to talk. The French experience in Algeria shows the universality of this counterproductive effect.146 In Northern Ireland, credible interlocutors were not only kept alive but protected by the British state, not because they were moderates but because they were pragmatists who the British believed they could one day talk to.147 Taliban leader, Mullah Omar, has tried to restrain the more radical, youthful, in-country commanders. Suicide bombing was introduced and expanded against his orders.148 He cannot stop the practice as this would alienate him from his increasingly extreme in-country leadership. Although perhaps convinced of the military utility of suicide bombing, it is Omar and the older, more pragmatic, conservative, Taliban leadership in Quetta, who continue to try to restrain the radicals. It is they that published the Layha, on limiting civilian casualties and carefully targeting suicide attacks against high-value military targets.149 Omar and the older leadership remain alive only because their safe haven prevents their being targeted. Without them, there would be no Lahya, no restraining hand on the more extremist fringe of the movement, and perhaps no one to negotiate with when the time comes. In Pakistan, the same evolution of insurgent groups is visible.150 The recent killing of Ilyas Kashmiri, leader of Harakatul Jihad-e-Islami (HUJI), by a CIA drone strike shows the dangers of removing older leaders. Kashmiri prevented his group from attacking Pakistani targets; now that restraint is gone. One HUJI commander witnessed: several occasions when Pakistani militant commanders … have tried to provoke him for not allowing his men to fight against Pakistani security forces, as they were arresting and killing his fighters and then cooperating with the Americans to eliminate him through their unmanned spy planes....Kashmiri Sahib would always turn down their suggestions and would tell them that Pakistan was a fortress of Islam and home of the brave Muslims.151 The Northern Irish, Chechen, Palestinian and Basque conflicts show the same evolution. In the late 1980s an entire generation of Loyalist leaders, mostly in their late 30s or early 40s, were killed by the IRA or arrested by the British. They had long feared the effects on Protestant communities of escalating sectarian violence in Northern Ireland, and in this sense, might be described as cautious and moderate. The generation of leaders that succeeded them were younger, more extreme and more violent. They pursued, unrestrained, their aim of ‘taking the fight to the IRA’, which meant, more often than not, targeting innocent Catholics.152 Targeted killing of Chechen insurgent leaders has reduced the average age of their commanders to around 40. Simultaneously, the insurgency has become more Islamist, less Nationalist, closer to global jihadi networks, and increasingly indiscriminate. Doku Umarov, who the Russians continue to try to kill, is a restraining hand on his Chechen fighters whose average age is 18.153 In Palestine the average age of Hamas activists and leaders, long targeted by Israel, is 30–40 while the average age of the more ‘moderate’ Palestinian Liberation Organisation leaders is 60–70.154 In 1960s Spain the Basque Nationalist group Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA) was formed by young men frustrated by the moderate Basque nationalist stance of their fathers.155 Their campaign of violence accelerated after their leader Tsabi Etxebarrieta was killed.156 General Mills, and many of those interviewed for this study, suggest that reducing the average age of insurgent leaders reduces the leadership’s experience and effectiveness.157 But a 23-year-old leader fighting in Afghanistan, Israel or Chechnya today, may have grown up fighting the counterinsurgents. IRA leader Seamus McElwaine, when he was killed aged 26, had been an effective terrorist for ten years.158 A Taliban commander aged 23 in 2011 may have been fighting ISAF since 2001, from the age of 16. His experience would all be relevant. He is not wedded to outmoded or ineffective tactics from ‘the last war’. His survival is testament to his improved OPSEC (operational security) and adoption of more effective tactics. Such men cannot be described as inexperienced.

#### Turn: Stigmatization – mere *perception* of submitting to US drone usage undermines allied governments legitimacy and capacity – crushes broader cooperation that’s key to the war on terror

Boyle 13 – Prof of PoliSci @ La Salle University, former adviser on the Obama campaign's counterterrorism expert group (Michael J, “The costs and consequences of drone warfare,” International Affairs 89: 1 (2013) 1–29, CMR)

Much of the existing debate on drones has focused on their legality under international and domestic law and their ethical use as a weapon of war.10 Setting these issues largely aside, this article will make a different case: that the Obama administration’s growing reliance on drone strikes has adverse strategic effects that have not been properly weighed against the tactical gains associated with killing terrorists. The article will focus primarily on the strategic costs of the CIA-run drone campaigns outside active theatres of war (specifically, Pakistan, Yemen and Somalia) and will not examine the benefits and costs of drones in active theatres of war such as Afghanistan.11 It will challenge the conventional wisdom that drone strikes in the ungoverned spaces of these countries are highly effective by contrasting claims about their relative efficiency at killing ‘bad guys’ with their political effects in the states where they are used. It will argue that drone strikes corrode the stability and legitimacy of local governments, deepen anti-American sentiment and create new recruits for Islamist networks aiming to overthrow these governments. Despite the fact that drone strikes are often employed against local enemies of the governments in Pakistan and Yemen, they serve as powerful signals of these governments’ helplessness and subservience to the United States and undermine the claim that these governments can be credible competitors for the loyalties of the population. This dynamic makes the establishment of a stable set of partnerships for counterterrorism cooperation difficult, if not impossible, because these partnerships depend upon the presence of capable and legitimate governments that can police their territory and efficiently cooperate with the United States. In this respect, American counterterrorism policy operates at cross-purposes: it provides a steady flow of arms and financial resources to governments whose legitimacy it systematically undermines by conducting unilateral drone strikes on their territory. This article will further argue that a drones-first counterterrorism policy is a losing strategic proposition over the long term. The Obama administration’s embrace of drones is encouraging a new arms race for drones that will empower current and future rivals and lay the foundations for an international system that is increasingly violent, destabilized and polarized between those who have drones and those who are victims of them.

#### Targeted killing causes terrorist alliances

Fisher 7 (W. JASON FISHER, Judicial Clerk to the Honorable James O. Browning, United States District Court for the District of New Mexico; J.D./M.A. University of California, Berkeley, Targeted Killing, Norms, and International Law, Columbia Journal of Transnational Law, Vol. 45, 2007, <http://heinonlinebackup.com/hol-cgi-bin/get_pdf.cgi?handle=hein.journals/cjtl45&section=25>) CMR

Arguments concerning the disadvantages of targeted killing must be weighed against these benefits. Primary among the drawbacks are that targeted killing may provoke retaliation in the form of increased attacks and that targeted killing may spur the recruitment of new terrorists by making martyrs of those killed and highlighting the terrorist organizations to which they belonged.145 The unprecedented wave of suicide bombings that followed the January 2002 targeted killing of Tanzim leader Raed al-Karmi in the West Bank has been cited to support the retaliation concern. 146 Targeted killing may also promote cooperation among historically adversarial terrorist groups against a common enemy.147 For example, at the 2001 **funeral of** Mustafa **Zibri**, a high-ranking member of the People's Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) **killed in a** targeted killing **strike** in the' West Bank, **leaders of** the **PFLP**, **Hamas**, **and Islamic Jihad** came together **in** a show ofanti-Israeli solidaritydespite traditional animosity amongst these groups. 148 Additionally, targeted killing may hurt the longer-term interests of States pursuing the tactic by removing potential future negotiating partners. 14 9 Further, insofar as pursuing the intelligence needed to conduct targeted killings effectively diverts re- sources away from gathering and analyzing more existential threats, such as threats from other States or the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, employing targeted killing as a counter-terrorism tactic may be detrimental to longer-term interests. 150

#### That causes WORSE forms of terrorism – turns case

Horowitz 13 (Michael C. Horowitz, Associate Professor University of Pennsylvania AND, Philip B. K. Potter, Assistant Professor University of Michigan, “Allying to Kill: Terrorist Intergroup Cooperation and the Consequences for Lethality,” January, <http://jcr.sagepub.com/content/early/2013/01/02/0022002712468726.abstract>, CMR)

CONCLUSION Terrorist groups collaborate to aggregate their capabilities, exchange resources, and share knowledge. The resulting alliances play a critical role in shaping the capabilities and behaviors of those groups. While scholars already know that the image of an individual terrorist as a “lone wolf” is often incorrect, the same is true for terrorist groups. A litany of examples from the 1970s to the present, covering groups located around the world, from Indonesia to Colombia to the Middle East, demonstrate that alliances between terrorist groups represent the rule much more than the exception. Collaboration often results in enhanced capabilities for the linked groups, leading to higher casualties when those groups engage in attacks. The cases and data presented in this paper provide powerful evidence that terrorist group alliances are a relevant topic for both scholars and policy makers. From a scholarly perspective, research that does not account for alliances between terrorist groups risks missing an important factor that can influence group behavior and shape their capabilities. For example, our evidence shows that a group that allies with another group that has used suicide bombing or other advanced strategies becomes much more likely to use high-casualty tactics. Thus, the false assumption that groups operate in isolation from each other could therefore lead to biased results whether the scholarship is qualitative or quantitative in nature. From a policy perspective, understanding these alliances provides vitally important information to those interested in counter-terrorism strategy. Intelligence organizations around the world already attempt, at the micro-level, to track internal terrorist networks. Our research suggests that expanding the focus of analysis to encompass external alliances could yield benefits as well. For example, placing a greater emphasis on tracking which groups collaborate could help government officials predict the type of attacks groups are likely to launch, as well as the effectiveness of those attacks. One example of this is the way U.S. government and other sources are gathering data on the improvised explosive devices increasingly featured in insurgent arsenals around the world. Some reports suggest, for example, that as foreign fighters in Iraq moved on to Afghanistan during 2008 and 2009, they providing a natural bridge for the diffusion of tactical knowledge (Shanker 2009). The transmission of knowledge allowed groups in Afghanistan to learn some specific advanced IED design and explosive techniques from those with experience in Iraq. This is far from the first time that ties between violent non-state actors have led to the transmission of information about how to conduct deadly attacks. It will not be the last time either, suggesting that research into the alliances between terrorist groups will remain an important topic in the years to come.

#### Targeted killing just relocates terrorists – expands attacks globally

Dear 12-5-13 (Keith Patrick, has a decade of experience in analyzing human behaviours and systems both in the UK and overseas, MA with distinction in terrorism and counter-terrorism from King’s College London, Squadron Leader in the Royal Air Force, “Beheading the Hydra? Does Killing Terrorist or Insurgent Leaders Work,” <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14702436.2013.845383>, CMR)

Widening the Zone of Instability Targeted killing displaces insurgents as they seek safe havens, widening the zone of instability. Daniel Byman’s studies of targeted killing in both the Israeli–Palestinian conflict and Afghanistan, argue that targeted killing drives insurgents into urban areas, where they hope to be harder to find.159 Many senior Al-Qaeda leaders have been arrested in Pakistan’s urban areas, where they were trying to avoid aerial surveillance by drones.160 Their movement, along with a similar migration of the Pakistani Taliban, has destabilised large areas of Pakistan.161 In Chechnya, Russian targeted killing and security force pressure has displaced Chechen insurgents from the cities, to the mountains, forests and sympathetic towns in neighbouring provinces.162 Targeted killing often causes insurgent groups to target those they had previously left alone, or to expand the area of conflict. There has never been a Taliban bombing in the West, but for the first time, in 2011, some in the movement have declared their intent to carry out such attacks.163 Militants did not attack Pakistan before 2001, since then, it has become a target, in part in response to the CIA’s target killing.164 The Pakistani Taliban are showing increasing ambitions to become a global terrorist group.165 In 2010 Faisal Shezad, linked to the TTP, attempted to detonate a car bomb in Times Square, New York.166 In 1974, the ‘decapitation’ of the IRA as a result of an intense programme of arrests led it to widen the focus for its attacks, carrying the fight to mainland Britain for the first time.167 After the SAS ambush of the IRA at Loughgall in 1987, the IRA widened its campaign further, attempting an attack on Gibraltar and planning attacks in West Germany on British military bases.168 In Chechnya, targeted killing has contributed to the insurgency’s decision to attack targets across Russia.169

# 2NC

## Solvency

### WPR

#### Circumvents on IAFH—Libya proves

John Yoo, Professor, Law, University of California, “Like It or Not, Constitution Allows Obama to Strike Syria without Congressional Approval,” FOX NEWS, 8—30—13, http://www.foxnews.com/opinion/2013/08/30/constitution-allows-obama-to-strike-syria-without-congressional-approval/#ixzz2eMgkST1x

Although hesitating to punish Syria for using chemical weapons, President Obama has decided that he can send the U.S. military into combat without Congress’s approval. Two years ago, the president took the same approach when he ordered a bombing campaign against Mummar Qaddafi’s regime in Libya, again without congressional consent. But this was not always President Obama’s view. Anti-war Democrats vigorously challenged President George W. Bush’s conduct of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq by claiming that he had violated Congress’s right to declare war. As a presidential candidate in 2007, Obama agreed: “The President does not have power under the Constitution to unilaterally authorize a military attack in a situation that does not involve stopping an actual or imminent threat to the nation.” Despite his mistakes in reading his domestic powers too broadly, this time President Obama has the Constitution about right. His exercise of war powers rests firmly in the tradition of American foreign policy. Fast forward four years. In announcing the intervention in Libya, Mr. Obama told Congress that he was acting “pursuant to my constitutional authority to conduct U.S. foreign relations and as commander in chief and chief executive.” Fast forward again to today. The White House again has decided it does not need Congress’s blessing to bomb targets in Syria related to the chemical weapons attack last week, over the objections of 200 members of Congress who are demanding that Obama seek legislative approval.

## Prolif

**AT: Modeling/Arms Race – 2NC US Not Key**

#### US drone usage legal – no modeling – and restraint wouldn’t solve

Anderson 10/9/13 – law prof @ Washington College of Law, visiting fellow @ Hoover Institution, Senior Fellow @ Brookings (Kenneth, “Drones Are the Future for Dull or Dangerous Missions”, http://www.lawfareblog.com/2013/10/drones-are-the-future-for-dull-or-dangerous-missions/ , CMR)

Meanwhile, however, campaigning organizations – in the US and elsewhere, but strongest by far in their impact in Europe – darkly warn that as weaponized drones spread, the US will reap what it has sown through its targeted killing policies, and come to regret its arrogant exercise of special power privileges. This is not a persuasive claim, I would say, or an accurate characterization of the US position. The US does not believe that it is merely availing itself of a technology to which, for a time, it has held special access, and law must conform to its special privileges. On the contrary, the US sees its use of drone warfare and targeted killing as both lawful and good policy, and this in large part because the US sees the situation as an armed conflict and legally constrained existing law of targeting. One might disagree – as many do, including some European allies, campaigning groups, and the ICRC – with parts of the US interpretation of those rules, particularly who can be targeted and when, but it is a legally defensible, articulated position that adheres to (and develops in the context of new technology) long-held US positions on targeting law. With respect to others such as China, Russia, or others, however, the US is not claiming special privileges of power here – “just because we can.” The US government appears perfectly happy to say that if other governments actually follow these targeting standards, it does not have a problem as a matter of the laws of war – including China or other potential state adversaries. The possibility that China and other states would somehow not have marched ahead to develop so important a civilian (and not just military), technology as drone aircraft just because the United States somehow did not do so is far-fetched at best. (I leave for another post the question of whether possible drone military encounters over islands contested between China and Japan are better or worse than the alternative encounters.) It is finally hard to say, save by speculation, how much campaigning efforts to stigmatize a weapon and governments that acquire it actually impact government policies – especially when the technology is going to be transformative in so many ways that military uses will be only one part. Still, I would guess that the impact in Europe has been to slow down – not stop, but slow, and possibly fatally so, from a “business model” standpoint – the European defense establishment’s development of military drone technology. In that sense it is speculative, yes, but an important missing link in the account of the business of European military drones that the WSJ article describes. But the result today is exactly what the article describes: from the standpoint of having a home-grown military drone technological base, as well as actually possessing drones and especially the latest technologies, Europe is left in the position of playing catchup.

**AT: Modeling/Arms Race – 2NC No Arms Race**

**AND, the costs outweigh the benefits – reject aff alarmism**

**Singh 12** – researcher at the Center for a New American Security (Joseph, “Betting Against a Drone Arms Race”, 8/13, <http://nation.time.com/2012/08/13/betting-against-a-drone-arms-race/#ixzz2TxEkUI37>, CMR)

In short, **the doomsday drone scenario** Ignatieff and Sharkey predict **results from an excessive focus on rapidly-evolving military technology.**¶ Instead, **we must return to what we know about state behavior** in an anarchistic international order. **Nations will confront the same principles of deterrence**, for example, **when deciding to launch a targeted killing operation regardless of whether they conduct it through a drone** or a covert amphibious assault team.¶ **Drones** may make waging war more domestically palatable, but they **don’t change the very serious risks of retaliation** **for an attacking state**. **Any state** **otherwise deterred from using force abroad will not** significantly **increase its power projection on account of acquiring drones**.¶ What’s more, **the very states** **whose use of drones could threaten U.S. security** – countries **like China** – **are not democratic, which means** that the possible **political ramifications** **of the low risk of casualties** resulting **from drone use are irrelevant**. For all their military benefits, putting drones into play requires an ability to meet the political and security risks associated with their use.¶ Despite these realities, there remain a host of defensible arguments one could employ to discredit the Obama drone strategy. The legal justification for targeted killings in areas not internationally recognized as war zones is uncertain at best.¶ Further, the short-term gains yielded by targeted killing operations in Pakistan, Somalia and Yemen, while debilitating to Al Qaeda leadership in the short-term, may serve to destroy already tenacious bilateral relations in the region and radicalize local populations.¶ Yet, **the past decade’s experience with drones bears no evidence** **of impending instability** **in the global strategic landscape**. Conflict may not be any less likely in the era of drones, but the nature of **21st Century warfare remains fundamentally unaltered despite their arrival in large numbers**.

**No Impact - Checks in place now.**

**Roberts, 13**

[Kristin, News Editor, National Journal, March 21, 2013, <http://www.nationaljournal.com/magazine/when-the-whole-world-has-drones-20130321>]

**The Obama administration appears to** be aware of and **concerned about setting precedents** through its targeted-strike program. When the development of a disposition matrix to catalog both targets and resources marshaled against the United States was first reported in 2012, officials spoke about it in part as an effort to create a standardized process that would live beyond the current administration, underscoring the long duration of the counterterrorism challenge. **Indeed, the president’s legal and security advisers have put considerable effort into establishing rules to govern the program.** Most members of the House and Senate Intelligence committees say they are confident the defense and intelligence communities have set an adequate evidentiary bar for determining when a member of al-Qaida or an affiliated group may be added to the target list, for example, and say that the rigor of the process gives them comfort in the level of program oversight within the executive branch. **“They’re not drawing names out of a hat here,” Rogers said. “It is very specific intel-gathering and other things that would lead somebody to be subject for an engagement by the United States government.”**

## Blowback

### 2NC---Defense---Decapitation Fails

#### Decapitation fails – Boyle says terrorists organizations are resilient to drone strikes – they empirically survive by relocating to safer areas and expanding recruitment – ensures greater threats emerge

#### Only a risk of our offense – organizations resilient to decapitation but it exacerbates recruitment

Jordan, Ph.D. political science and post-doctoral research fellow – Harris School of Public Policy Studies @ U Chicago, ‘9 (Jenna, “When Heads Roll: Assessing the Effectiveness of Leadership Decapitation,” Security Studies Vol. 18, Issue 4, p. 719-755)

The data presented in this paper show that decapitation is not an effective counterterrorism strategy. While decapitation is effective in 17 percent of all cases, when compared to the overall rate of organizational decline, decapitated groups have a lower rate of decline than groups that have not had their leaders removed. The findings show that decapitation is more likely to have counterproductive effects in larger, older, religious, and separatist organizations. In these cases decapitation not only has a much lower rate of success, the marginal value is, in fact, negative. The data provide an essential test of decapitation's value as a counterterrorism policy. There are important policy implications that can be derived from this study of leadership decapitation. Leadership decapitation seems to be a misguided strategy, particularly given the nature of organizations being currently targeted. The rise of religious and separatist organizations indicates that decapitation will continue to be an ineffective means of reducing terrorist activity. It is essential that policy makers understand when decapitation is unlikely to be successful. Given these conditions, targeting bin Laden and other senior members of al Qaeda, independent of other measures, is not likely to result in organizational collapse. Finally, it is essential that policy makers look at trends in organizational decline. Understanding whether certain types of organizations are more prone to destabilization is an important first step in formulating successful counterterrorism policies. This study illustrates the need to develop a new model for understanding the effectiveness of leadership decapitation. Extant analyses on leadership decapitation are unable to account sufficiently for variability in the success of decapitation. This study suggests that a group's age, type, and size are critical to identifying when decapitation will result in the cessation of terrorist activity. As an organization becomes older and larger, it is much more likely to withstand attacks on its leadership. All organizations need to replenish both members and leaders, and older organizations will have developed the networks and support systems necessary to replenish key members. This argument is consistent with the organizational literature on bureaucratic organizations. 106 As an organization ages and grows, it is also more likely to become bureaucratized and to develop a division of labor based on specialization. 107 It should be easier for organizations with a higher degree of specialization to replace leadership. The model of the firm may also be useful in understanding the strength of terrorist organizations. Early in its creation a firm should have a higher likelihood of falling apart. These variables suggest that the dynamic nature of organizations is essential to predicting when decapitation will be effective and can provide a richer basis for social network models of organizational strength and weakness. Existing approaches do not consider organizational change and are thus unable to account for variation in the rate of organizational collapse. The two dominant models that have been used to understand decapitation assume that an organization's vulnerability is based on static and unchanging characteristics regarding the role of a leader or the structure of an organization. The significance of organizational typology may signal an important relationship between organizational structure and a group's susceptibility to decapitation. Ideological organizations are most likely to fall apart after decapitation, while religious groups are highly resilient. There are two implications that can be derived from this finding. First, the charismatic model is insufficient to account for these findings. If religious and separatist organizations are more likely to have a charismatic leader then these organizations should be more likely to fall apart when the charismatic leader is removed. I argue that the resilience of religious organization can be attributed in part to the fact that many of these groups are older and larger. Second, it is frequently assumed that religious and separatist organizations are more decentralized in structure, while ideological organizations are more hierarchical. 108 The literature on social network analysis argues that decentralized organizations are less likely to suffer setbacks than hierarchically structured organizations. Initial findings support this claim. I argue that the weight of key organizational variables provides a more nuanced understanding of organizational structure and can account for more variability in the success of decapitation. Overall, this study shows that we need to rethink current counterterrorism policies. Decapitation is not ineffective merely against religious, old, or large groups, it is actually counterproductive for many of the terrorist groups currently being targeted. In many cases, targeting a group's leadership actually lowers its rate of decline. Compared to a baseline rate of decline for certain terrorist groups, the marginal value of decapitation is negative. Moreover, going after the leader may strengthen a group's resolve, result in retaliatory attacks, increase public sympathy for the organization, or produce more lethal attacks. Based on these findings, it seems imperative that policy makers consider not only the overall effectiveness of decapitation as a counterterrorism measure but also the potential for adverse consequences.

#### Next impact is decentralization – organizations unify and innovate – turns case

Dear 12-5-13 (Keith Patrick, has a decade of experience in analyzing human behaviours and systems both in the UK and overseas, MA with distinction in terrorism and counter-terrorism from King’s College London, Squadron Leader in the Royal Air Force, “Beheading the Hydra? Does Killing Terrorist or Insurgent Leaders Work,” <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14702436.2013.845383>, CMR)

\*\*\*Note - C2 = Command & Control

Less centralised C2 and increased operational security requirements mean that a local insurgent commander would receive less micro-management over communications networks, and instead would be given general guidance that he can interpret according to local conditions. This is ‘mission command’, which is advocated by the British military as the most effective form of leadership. The enforced adoption of Mission Command as the structural foundation of an insurgency will further encourage innovation.51

Taliban resilience to leadership targeting may be a product of the decentralisation of C2 in response to leadership targeting, but Afghan society, and particularly Pashtun society, is traditionally fractured and fragmented, and this may be the more important factor. The fragmented nature of the Taliban has been evident to mediators in the conflict. Seeking to bring insurgents into the peace process they have been forced to work on a piecemeal, district-by-district basis, demonstrating that Taliban C2 is not dependent on mid-level commanders.52 The vast majority of insurgents are known to fight within two to three kilometres of their homes, further suggesting that the insurgency in Afghanistan is fragmented by nature. 53

Whatever the cause of the Taliban’s ‘fragmented’, decentralised C2 that very few have reconciled suggests that fragmentation is not the same as disunity.54 The Taliban can and have maintained unity through ‘spectacular’ attacks to ensure they continue to be seen as the mouthpiece for the insurgency. Such propaganda of the deed enables them to frame the narrative in such a way as to maintain unity of purpose even as they preside over a highly decentralised network.55

Attempts to fragment the insurgency by destroying C2 may be counterproductive. Isolated cells are more innovative than hierarchical bureaucracies. Just as small, well-motivated, egalitarian companies are often more innovative than larger established hierarchical corporations, so social theory suggests unified groups with limited external links will be more innovative than those that are part of a clear hierarchical structure.56 An insurgent group made more cohesive through the psychological effects of targeted killing, and more cellular by the deliberate destruction of ‘links’, will probably be more innovative.

#### AND, Hardening – targeted killing strengthens organizations – ensures worse attacks in the future

Dear 12-5-13 (Keith Patrick, has a decade of experience in analyzing human behaviours and systems both in the UK and overseas, MA with distinction in terrorism and counter-terrorism from King’s College London, Squadron Leader in the Royal Air Force, “Beheading the Hydra? Does Killing Terrorist or Insurgent Leaders Work,” <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14702436.2013.845383>, CMR)

Offensive Capability Targeted killing aims ultimately to reduce the number and lethality of insurgent attacks. This can initially be achieved in cases where an organisation has limited support and vulnerable hierarchical command. Over time the effect of each killing will reduce and in time it may be counter-productive as groups become more resilient, evasive and effective through a process of evolution and adaptation. Two examples show how targeted killing can reduce insurgent technical capabilities, but they also demonstrate its limitations. In 1996 Israel killed Yahya Ayyash, nicknamed ‘the Engineer’ for his expertise in creating improvised explosive devices for suicide bombers. Colonel Roni Amir, head of doctrine for the Israeli Air Force, judges that the killing substantially reduced Hamas’ capabilities for some time. In July 2008, British forces in Afghanistan killed Mullah Sadiq, a Taliban commander from Sangin, Helmand.57 Sadiq was believed to be behind a shift in Taliban tactics towards a greater reliance on IEDs. Brigadier Mark Carleton-Smith, Commander Task Force Helmand at the time, states that in the aftermath of Sadiq’s death, there was a notable decline in the sophistication, and consequently the lethality, of the Taliban’s IEDs around Sangin.58 Yahya Ayyash’s killing may have temporarily reduced Hamas’ capabilities, but there was an immediate backlash, four suicide bombings killed 60 Israelis in the days that followed, and there has been no lasting effect. Suicide bombings against Israelis increased in frequency and sophistication despite his killing.59 In the month after Mullah Sadiq was killed, British casualties to IEDs in Helmand fell dramatically, but they had returned to similar levels by May the next year and surpassed them two months later.60 The reduction in lethality of attacks may have been a consequence of the loss of Mullah Sadiq, and with him the loss of some of the Taliban’s technical capability, but the effects were shortlived. The effect of killing Sadiq should have been heightened by NATO’s killing of close to the entire Taliban leadership in Kandahar and Helmand province in the five months that followed, and the ever-increasing tempo of targeted killings in the area.61 Instead, the continuing casualties in the south of Afghanistan from IEDs suggest the killing of facilitators had no lasting effect on the Taliban’s ability to build bombs.62 In the case of both Ayyash and Sadiq, targeted killing may have caused a temporary drop in insurgent technical capability, but it did nothing to reverse the tactical and technical trend. Killing ‘experts’ has limited effects in part because the level of expertise they require to be effective is so low that many can quickly learn the required skills. As Professor Ehud Keinan of the Israeli Institute of Technology has described, the manufacture of suicide vests is an ‘embarrassingly easy’ process.63 A US study of the Afghan conflict shows also that targeted killing of bomb-makers does not significantly reduce insurgent use of Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) or decrease the lethality of each device.64 The limited data released by the MOD on British casualty figures shows violence tracking seasonal trends relating more to the harvest, weather and ISAF (International Security Assistance Force) offensive operations than the killing of insurgent bomb-makers or leaders.65 The fracturing of finance networks achieved by killing or capturing financiers, and the cutting of finances by freezing financial assets is designed to reduce their capability by denying them funds. Its immediate effect is to force insurgents to raise finances locally and/or clandestinely. The Taliban have done this successfully, raising Usher, a tax on locals of 10 per cent, using Zakat, alms paid at the Mosque as a religious duty, as well as involvement in, and taxation of, the narcotics trade and funding through informal, difficult to track hawala networks.66 As a consequence the Taliban’s local structures are now more autonomous, financially independent and thus resilient than prior to the targeting of the financial ‘links and nodes’ in their network, a logical adaptation and perhaps standard insurgent response to such targeting. The killing of arms smugglers is also undertaken to reduce insurgent capability. Lieutenant General Nick Parker claims that the rising cost of fertiliser in Southern Afghanistan, widely used to make explosives, shows a shortage of supplies.67 Given that this occurred when the Taliban network was being hit harder than ever by the targeted killing campaign, a case could be made that the price increase was a product of the reduced supply caused by a loss of facilitators.68 It should be noted that the price increase might equally have been caused by rising demand, not a shortage of supply, but the more important counterpoint is that fertiliser was still available, as were alternate sources of explosives. There is no shortage of conventional munitions in most unstable areas and it is easy to make effective IEDs with such materials.69 Therefore targeted killing will often have little lasting effect on insurgent capability to build bombs. It has been suggested that the 13 April 2011 killing of Abu Hafs al-Nadji, a senior al Qaeda representative in Afghanistan, may have reduced the flow of foreign fighters into Afghanistan, something that he was involved in facilitating.70 In this example, targeted killing aimed to remove an individual who was a trusted interlocutor between distrustful elements of an insurgent group – non-Pashtun foreign volunteers and the predominantly Pashtun Taliban. There is no evidence to suggest killing al Nadji has reduced the number of foreign fighters arriving in Afghanistan, but there are a number of reasons to think it will not have done. Al Nadji will have been quickly replaced and recruits to Al-Qaeda continue to arrive in Pakistan hoping to fight in Afghanistan.71 It seems unlikely that the loss of one man would reduce the flow of foreign fighters into the country given that Jihadi groups across the world, and particularly those in Pakistan, have deep and extensive historical, and often familial and personal, links to Afghanistan. The effect of targeted killing may be greater on smaller groups, but even then it is limited. Seamus McElwaine, a particularly violent IRA activist, was killed in 1986, setting back the IRA in the area substantially.72 A year later, the SAS ambushed and killed an entire IRA active service unit as they attempted to destroy a police station at Loughgall.73 In the years that followed the SAS killed or arrested two generations of IRA leaders in the area, those in control and those in waiting, so bad was the damage that one IRA member commented that after 1992 ‘that was it; we had nobody left’.74 But even this increased effect on a smaller group was limited. In 1990 the IRA destroyed the remainder of Loughgall police station, and they continued to operate in South Fermanagh and Armagh until the end of the troubles.75 Even today, South Fermanagh remains the area with the highest threat from dissident Republican terrorists.76 Groups may become more resilient due to the adaptations they undergo when subjected to targeted killing. Aaron Mannes’ statistical assessment of Israeli targeted killing supported this analysis in finding ‘The most significant…[statistical result]…an increase in the number of [violent] incidents by religious organizations after they have lost their leader for the second or third time’.77 This reduced effect is simple to understand. If a role is vital to the functioning of your organisation, and you lose that person, the effect will be significant. If this happens again, you are likely to train two people for the role, in order to have some redundancy. If over time, turnover was very high, you would try to make sure all of your staff were able to cover the role. This would be difficult if the role required in-depth technical knowledge, but few if any insurgent roles do. As such, each targeted killing has less effect than the last, as the insurgency learns to decentralise and disperses responsibilities. Al-Qaeda in Pakistan have shown just such an adaptation, with many senior leaders now having joint responsibilities for areas once assigned to individuals, making a clear hierarchy and individual specialisations difficult to discern.78 Targeted killing, when selectively employed for a discrete purpose against a specific individual can reduce the capabilities of insurgent groups, but its effects reduce with each successive use as groups decentralise command and control and disperse capabilities in response.

#### Decapitation is IMPOSSIBLE – every historical example’s a failure

Dear 12-5-13 (Keith Patrick, has a decade of experience in analyzing human behaviours and systems both in the UK and overseas, MA with distinction in terrorism and counter-terrorism from King’s College London, Squadron Leader in the Royal Air Force, “Beheading the Hydra? Does Killing Terrorist or Insurgent Leaders Work,” <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14702436.2013.845383>, CMR)

Counterarguments In this final section I examine the case studies used in the counter-argument to the suggestion that targeted killing is of limited utility. I then consider the conclusions and suggestions of other critics of targeted killing. When successful ‘decapitation strategies’ are cited, they consistently focus on Guzman, of Peru’s Shining Path, and Abdullah Ocalan, of the Kurdish PKK.201 In both these cases, decapitation was by arrest, not targeted killing. In both examples, the leader called on his followers to put down their arms, leading to a dramatic collapse in the group’s effectiveness. In both examples, the underlying causes of the violence went unresolved, and the groups eventually returned to violence. Occasionally cited are the decapitation of the Philippine Abu Sayyaf splinter of the Moro Liberation Front, the Angolan UNITA, and the Sri Lankan LTTE.202 When Abdurajik Abubakar Janjalani, leader of the Abu Sayyaf group was killed, the network became a vast criminal enterprise. The group is still active, and seems to be moving back to its ideological struggle.203 The LTTE lost internal support from many Tamils for its human rights abuses and forced conscription of children. This, and the Sri Lankan government’s ability to take and hold land the LTTE had controlled, led to their defeat; yet even now the grievances that led to conflict remain unaddressed, and without a political solution, reports suggest the Tamils may well adopt terrorist tactics once more. Leadership targeting played a peripheral role, if any, in bringing the LTTE to defeat.204 UNITA was already on a path to peace, had handed over territory to the government, negotiated a gradual return to parliamentary democracy and, as with many case studies, had been more weakened by political engagement than it ever had been by military pressure. The killing of Jonas Savimbi and his deputy allowed the government to agree a political solution based on accords previously signed with Savimbi but never fully implemented. Thus his killing did contribute to peace, but not by deterring UNITA from fighting, but because the Government was unwilling to address the underlying causes until his death due to their personalisation of the conflict.205 Three other examples receive occasional citations: that of the Red Army Faction in Germany, Rohanna Vijeweera, of the Sri Lankan Janathā Vimukthi Peramua (JVP), and Fathi Shikaki, of Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ).206 The Red Army Faction’s leaders were imprisoned, not killed, and committed suicide, which would clearly have different effects on the remaining members of the group than their being ‘martyred.’ The group nevertheless continued until 1998.207 Rohanna Vijeweera’s killing was not the end of the JVP, though there were many premature predictions that it would be. Today the JVP is ‘perhaps the most resilient, dynamic and deeply-rooted political force in contemporary Sri Lanka’.208 PIJ retaliated following Fathi Shikaki’s killing with a double suicide bombing against Israeli settlers in Gaza, and another a year later in Tel Aviv. The fall in support for PIJ after Shikaki was killed was caused largely by the growth of the peace process, the Palestinian Authority’s clamp-down on other militant groups, and the growth of Hamas as the main rivals to the PA. By 2002, however, as the Peace Process collapsed, PIJ had fully recovered.209 In a review of 89 insurgencies, RAND found that targeted killing was not among the factors leading to insurgent defeat, while RAND’s study of 648 terrorist groups found that military force rarely brought an end to them.210 In two thorough studies of ‘How Terrorism Ends’, neither Audrey Cronin nor Martha Crenshaw finds an example of targeted killing ending a terrorist or insurgent group.211 Concerned with a lack of balance in my study in its later stages, I turned to respected terrorism expert the late Professor Wilkinson of the University of St Andrew’s Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence in search of a counterexample. He suggested the French group Action Directe, but noted that their entire leadership were arrested in an audacious raid rather than killed. Had they been killed, he said, the radicalising effect would probably have prolonged the organisation’s existence.212 There is no example of a ‘decapitation’ strategy by targeted killing ending a conflict, or providing the tipping point for the conflict’s end.

### A2 Deterrence

#### No deterrence

Dear 12-5-13 (Keith Patrick, has a decade of experience in analyzing human behaviours and systems both in the UK and overseas, MA with distinction in terrorism and counter-terrorism from King’s College London, Squadron Leader in the Royal Air Force, “Beheading the Hydra? Does Killing Terrorist or Insurgent Leaders Work,” <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14702436.2013.845383>, CMR)

Recruitment and retention of fighters should also be affected if targeted killing deters. This would be evidenced by a reduction in violence; but violence in Afghanistan has sustained or surpassed the high levels of 2009 throughout the stepped up targeted killing campaign in 2010 and 2011.87 The psychological aims of targeted killing are not met because they are based on a common sense, but unscientific, understanding of psychology. Counterinsurgents employing targeted killing for psychological effect assume that human beings make purely rational decisions based on a cost/benefit analysis of a given action and that they can remotely judge what is rational to the insurgent. They therefore believe they can increase the ‘cost’ of fighting to a point where it outweighs the benefit of doing so, and thereby induce behavioural changes in the insurgent. This section demonstrates that this is too simplistic. Human decision-making is much more complex. The application of scientific psychological understanding shows that the psychological effects of targeted killing are counterproductive. The idea that targeted killings deter is based on Rational Choice Theory (RCT) which holds that states and individuals make decisions based on a cost/benefit analysis, according to which they judge the best means to achieve their aims.88 But, as we have discussed, most are not deterred. Psychologist Ariel Merari notes that: In a perfectly rational system, the basic idea of deterrence is to deliver a clear, credible message to the opponent that the cost of pursuing a certain course of behavior outweighs its benefits. In reality, however, this simple formula rarely, if ever, works according to expectations.89 Some will be deterred but many will not. Rational decision-making in the context of insurgency is impossible to define and dependent on many factors. One cannot predict whether, in his or her mind, the cost, including the risk of being killed, will outweigh the benefit of achieving the objectives for which the insurgent fights.90 Humans tend to underestimate risks when they actively choose to expose themselves to danger. Thus the motorcyclist never believes he will die in an accident even as he acknowledges the relatively high statistical risk to motorcyclists.91 Similarly, insurgents may not judge the risks of fighting ‘rationally’. Furthermore, if night raids win sympathy and support for the Taliban, as former COMISAF General McChrystal once argued, the more strategically minded and radical of the Taliban might ‘rationally’ accept martyrdom to advance insurgent aims.92 Additionally, an RCT based approach assumes that becoming an insurgent is a wholly rational process. It is not. The decision to join the fight is often disadvantageous to the individual, and therefore cannot be adequately explained as a purely ‘rational’ decision.93

#### No dissuasion either

Dear 12-5-13 (Keith Patrick, has a decade of experience in analyzing human behaviours and systems both in the UK and overseas, MA with distinction in terrorism and counter-terrorism from King’s College London, Squadron Leader in the Royal Air Force, “Beheading the Hydra? Does Killing Terrorist or Insurgent Leaders Work,” <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14702436.2013.845383>, CMR)

Targeted Killing and Psychology Targeted killing aims to have psychological effects on insurgent groups to induce behavioural change. The intended psychological effects aim to deter insurgents from fighting, to cause dissension within groups and to divide groups.79 This section demonstrates that targeted killing does not achieve its psychological aims, shows why this is the case and demonstrates that the psychological effects are counterproductive. The basic psychological aim of targeted killing is to make insurgents in key positions so afraid of death that they giving up fighting.80 Major General Richard P. Mills, former ISAF Commander in Afghanistan’s Helmand and Nimruz Provinces, described this in May 2011 when he said that targeted killing aimed to make the Taliban ‘go back to their old way of life and put the rifle down and pick up a spade’.81 Occasionally this works. Taliban commander Eidi Mohammed from Baghdis has said he ceased fighting because ‘American operations are very effective: the night raids, the airstrikes and ground attacks…I was afraid they would kill me too.’82 More often it does not. Taliban commander Mullah Yunis knows he is near the top of the US Kill/Capture list in his region of Baghlan and knows death is likely to find him soon as many of his predecessors have been killed. Yet still he leads and fights, saying ‘if you kill us, we become stronger, and the number of our attacks will just increase as time passes’.83 The evidence supports his rhetorical claim. If insurgents were dissuaded from taking positions, there should be an extended list of vacancies in the Taliban’s shadow governance and military structure. Yet, according to the consensus view of the US intelligence agencies, the Taliban are able to ‘re-establish and rejuvenate’ often within days of a targeted killing, and a US Special Operations Force commander confirms that the insurgency takes only a few days to a few weeks to fill the gap left after a targeted killing.84 There are now more shadow governors across the country than ever before, the Taliban’s military structure contains no vacant posts and covers a wider area than at any point since 2001.85 Similarly, neither the Palestinian nor the Chechen insurgencies have vacant positions in their leadership, despite the targeted killing of their leaders.86

### Stigma

#### Perception of compliance with drone strikes crushes allied legitimacy and stability – key to broader counter-terror cooperation that outweighs solvency

Boyle 13 – Prof of PoliSci @ La Salle University, former adviser on the Obama campaign's counterterrorism expert group (Michael J, “The costs and consequences of drone warfare,” International Affairs 89: 1 (2013) 1–29, CMR)

The use of drones also has a series of second-order political effects that must be weighed against advantages accrued through the killing of terrorist operatives. Drones can subject governments to high levels of political pressure that make compliance with US requests more costly. They can multiply the ranks of enemies in insurgencies and undermine the social fabric that allows many of these societies to function. Many of these consequences are systematically discounted in analyses of drones that focus exclusively on how many terrorists are killed relative to civilians. More generally, these costs illustrate a central inconsistency of American policy: that if the commitment to degrade or destroy terrorists is put into practice with drone strikes, it will damage the perceived competence and legitimacy of governments that the US is most dependent upon for counterterrorism cooperation. The long-term goal of building strong and legitimate governments that can police their territory and work as reliable partners with the United States is undermined by a drones-first policy that sidelines these governments or treats them as subservient accomplices to the brute exercise of American power.

### 2NC---Terror Allies Turn

#### Targeted killing causes internal unity and terrorist alliances – numerous examples prove

Dear 12-5-13 (Keith Patrick, has a decade of experience in analyzing human behaviours and systems both in the UK and overseas, MA with distinction in terrorism and counter-terrorism from King’s College London, Squadron Leader in the Royal Air Force, “Beheading the Hydra? Does Killing Terrorist or Insurgent Leaders Work,” <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14702436.2013.845383>, CMR)

Groups rarely divide, but rather unify under pressure, as danger strengthens social bonds.99 Group identities are relational, thus the group, defines itself according to characteristics that it regards as different from those who are not in the group, known as the out-group. So the British, for example, are an in-group that define certain characteristics that are different from foreigners, the out-group. Out-group pressure unifies because it allows a clearer delineation of the in-group. So England football supporters are made up of fans of Arsenal, Manchester United, Liverpool, Newcastle etc., but when faced with an opponent, say Brazil, they are united. Targeted killing is a particularly dramatic example of out-group pressure, and its unifying effect will therefore be particularly pronounced. Out-group pressure can make members of an in-group more likely to sacrifice themselves on behalf of their group.100 Belgrade’s citizens, not always supporters of Milosevic, stood on bridges holding up targets during NATO air strikes, unified by attacks during the 1999 Kosovo conflict.101 Studies have shown how even strangers will risk their lives to save others in situations of danger, because the human response to danger is to unify to face an external threat.102 Another powerful unifier is shared traumatic experience. General Mills’ belief that seeing an insurgent’s body tossed in the back of a pickup truck dissuades villagers from joining the Taliban is unconvincing.103 Experiments have shown that shared traumatic experience bonds people together.104 Targeted killing often unifies, and psychology suggests it is unlikely to divide. Pressure on Al-Qaeda’s leadership has altered the group’s structure so much that Marc Sageman felt able to describe the global movement as a ‘leaderless jihad’.105 The evident isolation in which Osama bin Laden had been living in his hideout in Abbotabad, Pakistan, goes someway to support this. But though Al-Qaeda may be increasingly decentralised, it is by no means less united. In fact, since 2001, disparate Islamist groups have united under Al- Qaeda’s banner in, among others, Yemen, North Africa, Central Africa and Indonesia.106 Germany, Britain and the US all now have radical Islamists, born within their borders, claiming to fight for al Qaeda107. Similar effects can be observed in Spain, Northern Ireland, and Israel.108 Targeted killing has not split the Taliban, in fact, they are now more unified within, and more unified with other groups. In mid-2008 British commander Brigadier Mark Carleton-Smith claimed that leadership targeting had created ‘increasing fissures of stress through the whole [Taliban] organisation…[and] …internecine and fratricidal strife between competing groups’.109 By the end of his Helmand command in October 2008 he withdrew this claim.110 In May 2011 General Mills claimed that targeted killing had brought the Taliban to a ‘tipping point’.111 The evidence suggests he too is wrong. Kandahar residents, writers, and analysts, Alex Strick von Lindschoeten and Felix Kuehn recently confirmed earlier reports that the younger more radical Taliban are becoming ideologically and organisationally fused with Al- Qaeda.112 The Haqqani network too is increasingly indistinguishable from the Taliban. Siraj Haqqani, the youthful operational leader of the group said in interview that relations between Al-Qaeda, the Taliban and his group were excellent. Together, he said, they ‘resist against the cross worshippers by cooperating with us and us with them in one trench’. He described the organisational relationship between the Haqqani network and the Taliban, claiming that fighters from both groups served under each other’s leaders across Afghanistan, and that he sat on Mullah Omar’s Shura Council.113 In Pakistan, the unifying effect of targeted killing is just as clear. Groups with disparate aims before 2001 have become increasingly unified since, in part in response to targeted killing by US drones, as US Ambassador Anne Patterson has noted.114 In December 2007 13 factions formally coalesced under the banner of the Pakistani Taliban (TTP).115 In early August 2008, Baitullah Mehsud, leader of this new coalition, was killed in a drone strike.116 He was believed to be the TTP’s main link to Al-Qaeda.117 US Envoy to Afghanistan and Pakistan Richard Holbrooke claimed the TTP was on the verge of splitting, now that Baitullah Mehsud, the group’s ‘unifying force’, was dead.118 No group has split from the TTP since, but links to groups such as Lashkar-e-Taiba have grown, and in January 2011 five more groups merged with the Pakistani Taliban.119 Most worryingly, Al-Qaeda and the Pakistani Taliban are becoming increasingly inseparable.120

# 1NR

### Perm

#### Praxis is key – the permutation is politically and intellectually incoherent since it foregoes an unconditional commitment to peace – combining our strategies ensures cooption

Megroan 8 (Nick, Department of Geography, University of Newcastle, UK, “Militarism, Realism, Just War, or Nonviolence?”, Jan 1, Geopolitics, EBSCO, CMR)

**Every student** of the relations between states, **who** also **holds that** scholarly engagement **must** not merely **be theoretical and empirical but also** political **and** moral**, cannot avoid facing the question: in what circumstances, if at all, should a state be considered right in making or joining war?** The argument of this paper is simply that critical geopolitics has not properly grappled with this question in a systematic and consistent way. By virtue of opposition to certain wars but advocacy of others, by implicit use of just war categories and language in moral reasoning, it is de facto operating within the parameters **of** a version of **just war theory.** However, because this appro- priation is not made explicit – indeed, because just war theory is at times summarily dismissed – its appropriation is partial. This selective appropriat ion is problematic. Whilst critical geopolitical analyses of individual wars might be insightful and compelling, **the bigger picture may be one of** incoherence and subjectivity. The purpose of theory selectively deployed becomes confusing, critique may be turned in on itself, there is a lack of clarity and rigour in moral reasoning despite superficial rhetorical appeals to morality, and the political intent of the project becomes unclear and even co-optable **to the service of neoconservatism**. This partial and contradictory appropriation of just war theory is also intellectually unsatisfying, **and** limits the potential of critical geopolitics **to be taken seriously outside** a **small, self-selecting readership**. My objection thus far is not to just war theory per se. It provides a framework for reasoning about warfare that regards it as an evil to be deployed in only exceptional circumstances, and (despite its name), its pre- sumption is against violence. We liv e in a messy and complicated and vio- lent world. Just war theory’s insistence, against realism and militarism, that military violence is not beyond the le gitimate sphere of moral reasoning is important, and the arguments for the occasional and limited use of force to restore peace and rectify injustice are strong ones. If critical geopolitics wishes to locate itself explicitly in this school of thought, it will find compel- ling reasons for doing so and many allies already there. By this process, it will certainly refine and advance the project (of critical geopolitics) with an injection of intellectual rigour. As I have suggested with reference to Toal’s critique of the 1991 US war on Iraq as being about American identity, it could in turn also make an original contribution to thought about the category of just intention . However, whilst recognising its pa cific intent, **I remain** personally **unconvinced by just war theory** as used either consistently by theorists and jurists, or partially as in critical geopolit ics. Critical geopolitics, as I read it, is not simply about exposing the power-knowledge relationships at the heart of geopolitical reasoning, 91 and denaturalising the global order by portray- ing it as socially and historically constructed 92 through an “examination of the geographical assumpti ons, designations, and understandings that enter into the making of world politics” 93 and how places and people are stitched together to narrate and explain events. 94 It is all of these, but it is more: **a political project committed**, as Dalby puts it, **to challenging the specifications of politics and dangers used** to justify violence. 95 **Nonviolence, as a** positive political **method and** also a **vision** of peac e and justice that explicitly **eschews the resort to force,** is a project that has only recently begun to be studied and theorised in a system atic manner, and ha s already yielded many promising results. 96 Personally, like a growing number of people, I am persuaded by the case for a Christian praxis of nonviolence. 97 Geopolitics has a long and bloody history of providing arguments for war 98 – critical geopolitics should reject the temptation to provide more, and place its capa- bilities and insights in the service of this exciting relatively new and under- resourced proj ect, not just war theory, realism, or militarism. In his history of twentieth-century geopolitical thought, Polelle observed that it “led its believers to be resigned to the necessity of violent international conflict”. 99 It would be deeply ironic if critical geopolitics we re to make the same mis- take in the twenty-first.

#### The role of the judge should be to guide students toward ethically constructing advocacies – this means debate should focus on how we think about problems and not just the particular policy, so you should look at systems of warism versus pacificism and not the singular event of their impact scenarios – fiat isn’t real and we’re not policymakers – the only thing that matters is the value of our scholarship and the ability to translate that into political activity – and deprioritize issues of link uniqueness and transitions war – our link arguments prove there’s a larger set of social relations the plan creates and the standpoints we take in relation to that are important

Bleiker 3 Roland, Professor of International Relations, University of Queensland “Discourse and Human Agency” Contemporary Political Theory. Avenel: Mar 2003.Vol. 2, Iss. 1;  pg. 25

Confronting the difficulties that arise with this dualistic dilemma, I have sought to advance a positive concept of human agency that is neither grounded in a stable essence nor dependent upon a presupposed notion of the subject. The ensuing journey has taken me, painted in very broad strokes, along the following circular trajectory of revealing and concealing: discourses are powerful forms of domination. They frame the parameters of thinking processes. They shape political and social interactions. Yet, discourses are not invincible. They may be thin. They may contain cracks. By moving the gaze from epistemological to ontological spheres, one can explore ways in which individuals use these cracks to escape aspects of the discursive order. To recognize the potential for human agency that opens up as a result of this process, one needs to shift foci again, this time from concerns with Being to an inquiry into tactical behaviours. Moving between various hyphenated identities, individuals use ensuing mobile subjectivities to engage in daily acts of dissent, which gradually transform societal values. Over an extended period of time, such tactical expressions of human agency gradually transform societal values. By returning to epistemological levels, one can then conceptualize how these transformed discursive practices engender processes of social change. **I have used everyday forms of resistance to illustrate how discourses not only** frame **and** subjugate **our thoughts and behaviour, but also offer possibilities for human agency. Needless to say, discursive dissent is not the only practice of resistance that can exert human agency. There are many political actions that seek** immediate changes **in policy or institutional structures, rather than 'mere' shifts in societal consciousness. Although some of these actions undoubtedly achieve results, they are often not as potent as they seem. Or, rather, their** enduring effect **may well be primarily discursive, rather than institutional.** Nietzsche (1982b, 243) already knew that **the greatest events 'are not our loudest but our stillest hours.' This is why he stressed that the world revolves 'not around the inventors of new noise, but around** the inventors of new values.' **And this is why, for Foucault too, the** crucial site **for political investigations are** not institutions**, even though they are often the place where power is inscribed and crystallized. The fundamental point of anchorage of power relations, Foucault claims, is always located** outside institutions**, deeply entrenched within the social nexus. Hence,** instead of looking at power from the vantage point of institutions, one must analyse institutions from the standpoint of power relations (Foucault, 1982, 219-222).

### Case Outweighs

#### Restrictions cause net-more violence – laws of war legitimize longer-term actions and fragment dissent

Smith 2 – prof of phil @ U of South Florida

(Thomas, International Studies Quarterly 46, The New Law of War: Legitimizing Hi-Tech and Infrastructural Violence)

The argument advanced here is that the law of war has flourished at the cost of increased artificiality and elasticity. Law has successfully shaped norms and practices in the areas of warfare furthest from hi-tech tactics. Strides have been made, for example, in the 1980 United Nations Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons, and the 1997 Convention on the Prohibition of Anti-Personnel Mines. For hi-tech states, these are relatively low-cost laws. But when modern military necessity calls, the law of war has legitimized violence, not restrained it. New military technology invariably has been matched by technical virtuosity in the law. New legal interpretations, diminished ad bellum restraints, and an expansive view of military necessity are coalescing in a regime of legal warfare that licenses hi-tech states to launch wars as long as their conduct is deemed just. The new law of war burnishes hi-tech campaigns and boosts public relations, even as it undercuts customary limits on the use of force and erodes distinctions between soldiers and civilians. Modern warfare has dramatically reduced the number of direct civilian deaths, yet the law sanctions infrastructural campaigns that harm long-term public health and human rights

### Intervention Bad

#### Their call for humanitarianism hides that a long history of US intervention is the cause of these problems

Lawston and Murillo (Assistant Professor of Women’s Studies at California State University San Marcos; Prof @ University of San Diego) 9

(Jodie Michelle Lawston and Ruben R. Murillo, The discursive figuration of U.S. supremacy in narratives sympathetic to undocumented immigrants, Social Justice, 36.2 (Summer 2009): p38(16))

Such stories engender sympathetic feelings for immigrants, especially for children, in the reader. Faced with the shocking violence these children endure, the reader wants to "rescue them" or allow them to remain in the country. The focus on the travails and tribulations of undocumented children compels the reader to believe that conditions in the country of origin must be so bad that immigrants are willing to risk their lives and endure tortuous journeys to establish a "better life." In this way, the narrative naturalizes the United States as inherently superior to the immigrants' home countries without historicizing the direct involvement of the United States in creating oppressive social and economic conditions in Central America. Mexico serves as a melodramatic villain in Enrique's Journey, just as it does in 30 Days and Under the Same Moon. Readers learn how hostile and discriminatory some Mexicans are toward immigrants from Central America. This tends to placate the guilt and anxiety that many liberals feel over U.S. immigration policy and enforcement. The imperative to engage in charitable acts for the "less fortunate" is also an important part of the story. One of the book's most compelling chapters describes how residents in a small town in Vera Cruz throw bundles of food, clothing, and supplies to migrants riding the freight trains. Nazario's description of those generous people contrasts sharply with the hostile discrimination seen in Chiapas. She writes: Enrique expects the worst. Riding trains through the state of Chiapas has taught him that any upraised hand might hurl a stone. But here in the states of Oaxaca and Vera Cruz, he discovers that people are friendly. They wave hello and shout to signal if hostile police are lying in wait for them in an upcoming town (2006: 103). The altruism in Oaxaca and Vera Cruz breathes hope into a formerly bleak situation. Residents here tell Nazario (2006: 105), "If I have one tortilla, I give half away," "I know God will bring me more," "I don't like to feel that I have eaten and they haven't," and "It feels good to give something that they need so badly." These passages resonate poignantly with the sense of charity in the U.S. national imagination and they perhaps account for why Nazario's narrative won the Pulitzer Prize and became a bestseller. Charitable acts by these poor Mexicans move the typical American reader to offer a "helping hand" to undocumented immigrants and to "rescue" some of these children. But acts of charity do not make up for a legacy of conquest, neocolonialism, and U.S. interventionism; instead, like a shell game they distract groups and individuals from the causes of poverty**.** Charity Discourse: Raising Historical Amnesia It could be argued that Under the Same Moon and Enrique's Journey strive to contest the law-and-order discourses that frame much of the U.S. immigration debate. Public opinion is shaped to perceive undocumented immigrants as "criminals" who have willfully violated U.S. law by entering "illegally." Dramatized exaggerations of undocumented immigration heighten the sense of transgression and threat. As Escobar (2008: 62) points out, "images of Mexican migrants 'flooding' the U.S.-Mexico border saturate the media, constructing a crisis of 'invasion.'" In response, immigration laws such as IRCA and IIRAIRA are passed and border "security," policing, and detention are increased. Heightened vitriol characterizes public and media discourse, with nonwhite immigrants--especially Latinos--portrayed as "lazy" and "violent" "drains on society." Sympathetic works such as Enrique's Journey and Under the Same Moon may offer a humanizing alternative to law-and-order discourses, but they do not historicize or contextualize the U.S. role in creating and maintaining migration. They depict the United States as a more desirable place to live than the immigrants' countries of origin and assume that the affluence, prosperity, and modern conveniences that underwrite U.S. national identity are irresistibly enticing. The message communicated is that these immigrants would not be willing to risk rape, assault, robbery, arrest, and detention to reach the United States if it were not superior to the places from which they were trying to flee. The long history of U.S. interventionism in Latin America created the dramatic disparity between immigrants' home countries and the United States. The litany includes invasions of Mexico, El Salvador, Nicaragua, and Panama, financial, tactical, and political support of repressive military regimes and dictatorships, as well as economic exploitation of Latin America's natural resources and labor force. Robert Kahn (1996) draws our attention to the Central American wars of the 1980s. The Reagan administration supported corrupt, repressive regimes in Nicaragua, El Salvador, Honduras, and Guatemala because these governments professed opposition to communism. Prolonged, bloody wars victimized Central Americans, as did repressive governments supported by the United States. By 1989, the violence in Central America had claimed the lives of a quarter of a million people, most of whom were killed by their own governments or by paramilitary groups trained and supplied by the United States. The U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service and the Department of Justice--under pressure from Washington--categorically denied the asylum petitions of thousands of war refugees and detained them until they were deported, often to their deaths (Ibid.).

#### The root cause of the conflicts they want to intervene in is colonialism but intervention leads to worse structural violence and is a smokescreen for imperialism

Castles 3

(Stephen, Towards a Sociology of Forced Migration and Social Transformation, Sociology, Vol. 77, no. 1, pp. 13-34, 2003)

The context of this trend was the inability to achieve economic and social development and the failure to build legitimate and stable states in large areas of the South. What Mary Caldor calls ‘the new wars’ are usually internal wars connected with identity struggles, ethnic divisions, problems of state formation and competition for economic assets. But they are simultaneously transnational as they involve diaspora populations, foreign volunteers and mercenaries, and international intervention forces. They also draw in international journalists, UN aid organizations, NGOs, and regional organizations. The means of warfare have also changed. The protagonists are not large standing armies but irregular forces. The aim is not control of territory, but political control of the population. Mass population expulsion is often a strategic goal, which is why the new wars have led to such an upsurge in forced migration (Kaldor 2001). Ninety per cent of those killed are civilians. Both government forces and insurgents use exemplary violence including torture and sexual assault as means of control. Many politicians and media commentators saw the ethnic cleansing and genocide of Former Yugoslavia, Rwanda etc. as the resurgence of ‘age-old hatreds’. It is more accurate to see such practices as systemic elements of a thoroughly modern new form of warfare (Summerfield 1999). Northern economic interests (such as the trade in oil, diamonds, coltan or small arms) play an important part in starting or prolonging local wars. At a broader level, trade, investment and intellectual property regimes that favour the industrialised countries maintain underdevelopment in the South. Conflict and forced migration are thus ultimately an integral part of the North-South division. This reveals the ambiguity of efforts by the ‘international community’ (which essentially means the powerful Northern states and the intergovernmental agencies) to prevent forced migration. They seek to do this through both entry restrictions in the North and ‘containment’ measures in the South. Containment includes humanitarian aid, peace-keeping missions and even military intervention. At the same time, the North does more to cause forced migration than to stop it, through enforcing an international economic and political order that causes underdevelopment and conflict. However, violence and forced migration also causes social transformation. They destroy economic resources, undermine traditional ways of life and break up communities. Forced migration is thus a factor which deepens underdevelopment, weakens social bonds, and reduces the capacity of communities and societies to achieve positive change. Post-conflict reconstruction rarely leads to restoration of the pre-conflict situation, but rather to new and often problematic social relationships. The study of forced migration therefore should be a central part of the sociology of development. Forced migration is a factor in social transformation in an additional sense, as Mark Duffield has recently argued (Duffield 2001). Persistent underdevelopment in large parts of the South is not an economic problem for the North, because these countries are largely disconnected from the global economy. However, underdevelopment is increasingly seen as a threat to security in the North. This is because the South connects with the North in unexpected and unwanted ways: through the proliferation of transnational informal networks, such as international crime, the drug trade, people smuggling and trafficking, as well as migrant networks which facilitate irregular mobility. Such phenomena are partly a result of trends towards economic deregulation and privatisation in the North, which open up the space for informal economies. The Al Qaida network can be seen as the very epitome of an undesirable transnational network, whose goals and mode of operation would have been unthinkable in any earlier epoch. Duffield argues that the result is a fundamental change in the objectives of both development policy and humanitarianism. Containment of forced migration through neutral humanitarianism has failed. Similarly, the Washington Consensus – the neo-liberal credo of the World Bank and the IMF that underdevelopment could be countered by economic growth based on foreign investments and export-led growth – has proved mistaken. Humanitarianism and development policy have a new joint task: the transformation of whole societies in order to prevent conflict and to achieve social and economic change. The principle of transforming whole societies was contained in a remarkable lecture by the then Senior Vice-President of the World Bank, Joseph Stiglitz, in 1998. He argued that development required fundamental shifts in cultural values and social relationships, and that it was the task of international agencies to help bring these about (Stiglitz 1998). In the meantime, Stiglitz has left the World Bank and been awarded the 2001 Nobel Prize for Economics. Development is now seen by Northern governments and international agencies as impossible without security and peace. This means that humanitarian action and military intervention can no longer attempt to be neutral. Rather, such interventions seek to restore peace at the local level through imposing certain political and economic structures as part of a system of ‘networked global liberal governance**’**. This system has ‘a radical mission to transform societies as a whole, including the attitudes and beliefs of the people within them’ (Duffield 2001). The price of being connected to global economic and political networks is thus the adoption of Northern economic structures, political institutions and value systems.

### Impacts

#### Structural violence is the proximate cause of all war- creates priming that psychologically structures escalation

\*\*Answers no root cause- because there is no root cause we must be attentative to structural inequality of all kinds because it primes people for broader violence- our impact is about the *scale* of violence and the *disproportionate* *relationship* between that scale and warfare, not that one form of social exclusion comes first

Scheper-Hughes and Bourgois ‘4(Prof of Anthropology @ Cal-Berkely; Prof of Anthropology @ UPenn) (Nancy and Philippe, Introduction: Making Sense of Violence, in Violence in War and Peace, pg. 19-22)

This large and at first sight “messy” Part VII is central to this anthology’s thesis. It encompasses everything from the routinized, bureaucratized, and utterly banal violence of children dying of hunger and maternal despair in Northeast Brazil (Scheper-Hughes, Chapter 33) to elderly African Americans dying of heat stroke in Mayor Daly’s version of US apartheid in Chicago’s South Side (Klinenberg, Chapter 38) to the racialized class hatred expressed by British Victorians in their olfactory disgust of the “smelly” working classes (Orwell, Chapter 36). In these readings violence is located in the symbolic and social structures that overdetermine and allow the criminalized drug addictions, interpersonal bloodshed, and racially patterned incarcerations that characterize the US “inner city” to be normalized (Bourgois, Chapter 37 and Wacquant, Chapter 39). Violence also takes the form of class, racial, political self-hatred and adolescent self-destruction (Quesada, Chapter 35), as well as of useless (i.e. preventable), rawly embodied physical suffering, and death (Farmer, Chapter 34). Absolutely central to our approach is a blurring of categories and distinctions between wartime and peacetime violence. Close attention to the “little” violences produced in the structures, habituses, and mentalites of everyday life shifts our attention to pathologies of class, race, and gender inequalities. More important, it interrupts the voyeuristic tendencies of “violence studies” that risk publicly humiliating the powerless who are often forced into complicity with social and individual pathologies of power because suffering is often a solvent of human integrity and dignity. Thus, in this anthology we are positing a violence continuum comprised of a multitude of “small wars and invisible genocides” (see also Scheper- Hughes 1996; 1997; 2000b) conducted in the normative social spaces of public schools, clinics, emergency rooms, hospital wards, nursing homes, courtrooms, public registry offices, prisons, detention centers, and public morgues. The violence continuum also refers to the ease with which humans are capable of reducing the socially vulnerable into expendable nonpersons and assuming the license - even the duty - to kill, maim, or soul-murder. We realize that in referring to a violence and a genocide continuum we are flying in the face of a tradition of genocide studies that argues for the absolute uniqueness of the Jewish Holocaust and for vigilance with respect to restricted purist use of the term genocide itself (see Kuper 1985; Chaulk 1999; Fein 1990; Chorbajian 1999). But we hold an opposing and alternative view that, to the contrary, it is absolutely necessary to make just such existential leaps in purposefully linking violent acts in normal times to those of abnormal times. Hence the title of our volume: Violence in War and in Peace. If (as we concede) there is a moral risk in overextending the concept of “genocide” into spaces and corners of everyday life where we might not ordinarily think to find it (and there is), an even greater risk lies in failing to sensitize ourselves, in misrecognizing protogenocidal practices and sentiments daily enacted as normative behavior by “ordinary” good-enough citizens. Peacetime crimes, such as prison construction sold as economic development to impoverished communities in the mountains and deserts of California, or the evolution of the criminal industrial complex into the latest peculiar institution for managing race relations in the United States (Waquant, Chapter 39), constitute the “small wars and invisible genocides” to which we refer. This applies to African American and Latino youth mortality statistics in Oakland, California, Baltimore, Washington DC, and New York City. These are “invisible” genocides not because they are secreted away or hidden from view, but quite the opposite. As Wittgenstein observed, the things that are hardest to perceive are those which are right before our eyes and therefore taken for granted. In this regard, Bourdieu’s partial and unfinished theory of violence (see Chapters 32 and 42) as well as his concept of misrecognition is crucial to our task. By including the normative everyday forms of violence hidden in the minutiae of “normal” social practices - in the architecture of homes, in gender relations, in communal work, in the exchange of gifts, and so forth - Bourdieu forces us to reconsider the broader meanings and status of violence, especially the links between the violence of everyday life and explicit political terror and state repression, Similarly, Basaglia’s notion of “peacetime crimes” - crimini di pace - imagines a direct relationship between wartime and peacetime violence. Peacetime crimes suggests the possibility that war crimes are merely ordinary, everyday crimes of public consent applied systematically and dramatically in the extreme context of war. Consider the parallel uses of rape during peacetime and wartime, or the family resemblances between the legalized violence of US immigration and naturalization border raids on “illegal aliens” versus the US government- engineered genocide in 1938, known as the Cherokee “Trail of Tears.” Peacetime crimes suggests that everyday forms of state violence make a certain kind of domestic peace possible. Internal “stability” is purchased with the currency of peacetime crimes, many of which take the form of professionally applied “strangle-holds.” Everyday forms of state violence during peacetime make a certain kind of domestic “peace” possible. It is an easy-to-identify peacetime crime that is usually maintained as a public secret by the government and by a scared or apathetic populace. Most subtly, but no less politically or structurally, the phenomenal growth in the United States of a new military, postindustrial prison industrial complex has taken place in the absence of broad-based opposition, let alone collective acts of civil disobedience. The public consensus is based primarily on a new mobilization of an old fear of the mob, the mugger, the rapist, the Black man, the undeserving poor. How many public executions of mentally deficient prisoners in the United States are needed to make life feel more secure for the affluent? What can it possibly mean when incarceration becomes the “normative” socializing experience for ethnic minority youth in a society, i.e., over 33 percent of young African American men (Prison Watch 2002). In the end it is essential that we recognize the existence of a genocidal capacity among otherwise good-enough humans and that we need to exercise a defensive hypervigilance to the less dramatic, permitted, and even rewarded everyday acts of violence that render participation in genocidal acts and policies possible (under adverse political or economic conditions), perhaps more easily than we would like to recognize. Under the violence continuum we include, therefore, all expressions of radical social exclusion, dehumanization, depersonal- ization, pseudospeciation, and reification which normalize atrocious behavior § Marked 18:33 § and violence toward others. A constant self-mobilization for alarm, a state of constant hyperarousal is, perhaps, a reasonable response to Benjamin’s view of late modern history as a chronic “state of emergency” (Taussig, Chapter 31). We are trying to recover here the classic anagogic thinking that enabled Erving Goffman, Jules Henry, C. Wright Mills, and Franco Basaglia among other mid-twentieth-century radically critical thinkers, to perceive the symbolic and structural relations, i.e., between inmates and patients, between concentration camps, prisons, mental hospitals, nursing homes, and other “total institutions.” Making that decisive move to recognize the continuum of violence allows us to see the capacity and the willingness - if not enthusiasm - of ordinary people, the practical technicians of the social consensus, to enforce genocidal-like crimes against categories of rubbish people. There is no primary impulse out of which mass violence and genocide are born, it is ingrained in the common sense of everyday social life. The mad, the differently abled, the mentally vulnerable have often fallen into this category of the unworthy living, as have the very old and infirm, the sick-poor, and, of course, the despised racial, religious, sexual, and ethnic groups of the moment. Erik Erikson referred to “pseudo- speciation” as the human tendency to classify some individuals or social groups as less than fully human - a prerequisite to genocide and one that is carefully honed during the unremark- able peacetimes that precede the sudden, “seemingly unintelligible” outbreaks of mass violence. Collective denial and misrecognition are prerequisites for mass violence and genocide. But so are formal bureaucratic structures and professional roles. The practical technicians of everyday violence in the backlands of Northeast Brazil (Scheper-Hughes, Chapter 33), for example, include the clinic doctors who prescribe powerful tranquilizers to fretful and frightfully hungry babies, the Catholic priests who celebrate the death of “angel-babies,” and the municipal bureaucrats who dispense free baby coffins but no food to hungry families. Everyday violence encompasses the implicit, legitimate, and routinized forms of violence inherent in particular social, economic, and political formations. It is close to what Bourdieu (1977, 1996) means by “symbolic violence,” the violence that is often “nus-recognized” for something else, usually something good. Everyday violence is similar to what Taussig (1989) calls “terror as usual.” All these terms are meant to reveal a public secret - the hidden links between violence in war and violence in peace, and between war crimes and “peace-time crimes.” Bourdieu (1977) finds domination and violence in the least likely places - in courtship and marriage, in the exchange of gifts, in systems of classification, in style, art, and culinary taste- the various uses of culture. Violence, Bourdieu insists, is everywhere in social practice. It is misrecognized because its very everydayness and its familiarity render it invisible. Lacan identifies “rneconnaissance” as the prerequisite of the social. The exploitation of bachelor sons, robbing them of autonomy, independence, and progeny, within the structures of family farming in the European countryside that Bourdieu escaped is a case in point (Bourdieu, Chapter 42; see also Scheper-Hughes, 2000b; Favret-Saada, 1989). Following Gramsci, Foucault, Sartre, Arendt, and other modern theorists of power-vio- lence, Bourdieu treats direct aggression and physical violence as a crude, uneconomical mode of domination; it is less efficient and, according to Arendt (1969), it is certainly less legitimate. While power and symbolic domination are not to be equated with violence - and Arendt argues persuasively that violence is to be understood as a failure of power - violence, as we are presenting it here, is more than simply the expression of illegitimate physical force against a person or group of persons. Rather, we need to understand violence as encompassing all forms of “controlling processes” (Nader 1997b) that assault basic human freedoms and individual or collective survival. Our task is to recognize these gray zones of violence which are, by definition, not obvious. Once again, the point of bringing into the discourses on genocide everyday, normative experiences of reification, depersonalization, institutional confinement, and acceptable death is to help answer the question: What makes mass violence and genocide possible? In this volume we are suggesting that mass violence is part of a continuum, and that it is socially incremental and often experienced by perpetrators, collaborators, bystanders - and even by victims themselves - as expected, routine, even justified. The preparations for mass killing can be found in social sentiments and institutions from the family, to schools, churches, hospitals, and the military. They harbor the early “warning signs” (Charney 1991), the “priming” (as Hinton, ed., 2002 calls it), or the “genocidal continuum” (as we call it) that push social consensus toward devaluing certain forms of human life and lifeways from the refusal of social support and humane care to vulnerable “social parasites” (the nursing home elderly, “welfare queens,” undocumented immigrants, drug addicts) to the militarization of everyday life (super-maximum-security prisons, capital punishment; the technologies of heightened personal security, including the house gun and gated communities; and reversed feelings of victimization).

#### **Prefer this impact – structural violence is invisible and exponential – ethics**

Nixon 11

(Rob, Rachel Carson Professor of English, University of Wisconsin-Madison, Slow Violence and the Environmentalism of the Poor, pgs. 2-3)

Three primary concerns animate this book, chief among them my conviction that we urgently need to rethink-politically, imaginatively, and theoretically-what I call "slow violence." By slow violence I mean a violence that occurs gradually and out of sight, a violence of delayed destruction that is dispersed across time and space, an attritional violence that is typically not viewed as violence at all. Violence is customarily conceived as an event or action that is immediate in time, explosive and spectacular in space, and as erupting into instant sensational visibility. We need, I believe, to engage a different kind of violence, a violence that is neither spectacular nor instantaneous, but rather incremental and accretive, its calamitous repercussions playing out across a range of temporal scales. In so doing, we also need to engage the representational, narrative, and strategic challenges posed by the relative invisibility of slow violence. Climate change, the thawing cryosphere, toxic drift, biomagnification, deforestation, the radioactive aftermaths of wars, acidifying oceans, and a host of other slowly unfolding environmental catastrophes present formidable representational obstacles that can hinder our efforts to mobilize and act decisively. The long dyings-the staggered and staggeringly discounted casualties, both human and ecological that result from war's toxic aftermaths or climate change-are underrepresented in strategic planning as well as in human memory. Had Summers advocated invading Africa with weapons of mass destruction, his proposal would have fallen under conventional definitions of violence and been perceived as a military or even an imperial invasion. Advocating invading countries with mass forms of slow-motion toxicity, however, requires rethinking our accepted assumptions of violence to include slow violence. Such a rethinking requires that we complicate conventional assumptions about violence as a highly visible act that is newsworthy because it is event focused, time bound, and body bound. We need to account for how the temporal dispersion of slow violence affects the way we perceive and respond to a variety of social afflictions-from domestic abuse to posttraumatic stress and, in particular, environmental calamities. A major challenge is representational: how to devise arresting stories, images, and symbols adequate to the pervasive but elusive violence of delayed effects. Crucially, slow violence is often not just attritional but also exponential, operating as a major threat multiplier; it can fuel long-term, proliferating conflicts in situations where the conditions for sustaining life become increasingly but gradually degraded.